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Ever since Miranda v. Arizona,1 the police have been required to inform a
suspect in custody,2 prior to any questioning, 3 that he has a right to remain
silent, that his statements may be used against him at trial, and that he may
have retained or appointed counsel present during the interrogation. 4 The
Miranda warnings are intended to counteract the inherently compelling
pressures of custodial interrogation, 5 enabling a suspect to exercise his Fifth
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although Miranda is now over 25 years old, scholars continue
to debate its legitimacy. See, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 1417 (1985); Justice William H. Erickson, The Unfidfilled Promise of Miranda v.
Arizona, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 291 (1987); Andrew L. Frey, Modem Police
Interrogation Law: 77Te Wrong Road Taken, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 731 (1981); Joseph D.
Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph Over Substance and
Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243 (1987); Yale Kamisar, Miranda.- The Case, the Man,
and the Players, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1074 (1984); Stephen 1. Markman, The Fifh
Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U.
CIE. L. REV. 938 (1987); Stephen J. Schuihofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CI. L.
REV. 435 (1987); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Filih Amendment at Justice: A Reply, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 950 (1987); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda. A Reply to Professor
Caplan, 39 VMD. L. REV. 1 (1986); Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from the
Backseat of a Police Squad Car, 70 B.U. L. REV. 543 (1990).
2 The police must read the Miranda warnings when a suspect is arrested or
significantly deprived of his freedom of action. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435
(1984). In determining whether a suspect is in custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom, the "relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have
understood the situation." Id. at 442 (footnote omitted).
3 The Miranda warnings are required before express questioning and "any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnotes omitted). The
latter portion of this definition focuses primarily on the suspect's perceptions, rather than on
the intent of the police. Id.
4 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
5 Id. at 467; see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 491 (1990) ("[Cloercive
pressures... accompany custody and ... may increase as custody is prolonged.");
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 583 (1990) (ruling that the inherently coercive
environment created by the custodial interrogation precludes the option of remaining silent);
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) ("[The prophylactic protections that the
[Vol. 53:805
MIRANDA AND NONTESTIMONIAL FRUIT
Amendment right against self-mcrimiation. 6 If the police fail to read the
warnings before questioning, the prosecution may not use the suspect's
statements in its case-n-chief in a subsequent criminal trial. 7
Suppose the police use the suspect's unwarned statements to discover
nontestimomal evidence, such as weapons or narcotics. Should the prosecution
also be prohibited from introducing this derivative evidence at trial? Consider
the following example: The police arrest Jones for allegedly murdering his wife
and interrogate him without reading the Miranda warnings. The police ask
Jones if he owns a gun, m an effort to locate the murder weapon. He responds
that he keeps a loaded pistol hidden in the shed in his backyard. The police
locate the weapon and conclude that it has been fired. The prosecution offers
the gun into evidence m its case-in-chief at Jones's trial for murder.
Does Jones have any legal basis for excluding the gun at his trial? For the
past fifty years, the Supreme Court has prohibited the prosecution from
introducing the evidentiary "fruits" of illegally obtained evidence under the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 8 The primary purpose of the poisonous
Miranda warings provide counteract the 'inherently compelling pressures' of custodial
interrogation and 'permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-
incrimunation' .") (citation omitted); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-01 (1975)
(Miranda warnings are designed "to protect Fifth Amendment rights against 'the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.'") (citation omitted).
6 The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself "U.S. CONST. amend. V
7 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Exclusion of statements made in the absence of the
Miranda warnings "serves to deter the taking of an incriminating statement without first
informing the individual of his Fifth Amendment rights." Brown, 422 U.S. at 601.
8 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The evidence initially obtained
through misconduct is the "poisonous tree." When this evidence leads to other evidence, the
latter-or denvative evidence-is the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
The Supreme Court first recognized a derivative evidence rule in Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The Court ruled that the government could not
use information gained during an unlawful search and seizure to support a subpoena for the
very same articles illegally seized but later returned. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Court, said, "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all." Id. at 392.
The Court's next opportunity to apply a derivative evidence rule came almost two
decades later in Nardone, the case that first coined the phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Following Silverthorne, the Court ruled that the government was precluded from using
illegal wiretap messages not only as direct proof of the defendant's guilt, but also as a basis
to build a case against him on retrial. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 340-41. Permitting the accused
"to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous
tree," the Court said, "To forbid the direct use of [illegally obtained evidence] but to
put no curb on [its] full indirect use would only invite the very methods deemed
'inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.'" Id.
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tree doctrine is to deter the police from committing future misconduct by
depriving them of the "fruits" of their misdeeds. 9 The doctrine assumes that
the police will not be effectively deterred if they may use inadmissible evidence
to gather other Incriminating proof for use at trial.' 0
Although the Supreme Court has applied the poisonous tree doctrine to
constitutional" and statutory 12 violations, it has never decided whether the
In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963), the Court extended the
poisonous tree doctrine to exclude the indirect products of police misconduct. The Court
ruled that a suspect's confession, and the narcotics discovered as a result of that confession,
were the "fruits" of an unconstitutional entry and arrest. Wong Sun gave the poisonous tree
doctrine its modern formulation:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it
would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more
apt question m such a case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence to wluch instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint."
Id. at 487-88 (quoting JOHN M. MAQUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT: RESTRICTIONS UPON ITS
DISCOVERY OR COMPULSORY DIsCLOSURE 221 (1959)).
The Court continues to recognize and apply the poisonous tree doctrine. See, e.g.,
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1988); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
441 (1984); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 597-600 (1975). However, there are several
recogmzed exceptions to the doctrine. See also infra note 19.
9 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984). The Court has recognized subsidiary
justifications for the poisonous tree doctrine: (1) to ensure that courts do not become
accomplices to the admission of tainted evidence, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222-23 (1960); and (2) to prevent the government, as lawbreaker, from signaling to the
citizenry that it is appropriate to disobey the law, Mapp v. Olo, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In
recent years, the Court has relegated these rationales to subordinate status. See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976); United States v. Jams, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35
(1976).
10 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939). By suppressing derivative
evidence, the poisonous tree doctrine places the government and the defendant in the same
position as if the wrongdoing had not occurred and allows the prosecution to proceed on the
basis of evidence secured independently of misconduct. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43, 447.
11 See, e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690-94 (1982) (suppressing confession
as fruit of unconstitutional arrest); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-19 (1979)
(suppressing confession as fruit of unconstitutional arrest); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
597-605 (1975) (suppressing confession as fruit of unconstitutional arrest); Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) (suppressing tangible evidence as fruit of unconstitutional
seizure); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963) (supressing confession,
and narcotics discovered as a result of confession, as fruits of unconstitutional entry and
arrest).
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doctrine applies when the police fail to read the Miranda warnings and
thereafter use a suspect's statements to discover nontestimomal evidence.13
Shortly after Miranda was decided in 1966, federal and state courts generally
excluded such evidence. 14 Since the Supreme Court's 1985 ruling in Oregon v.
12 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 338-41 (1939); see also Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984) (holding that poisonous tree doctrine is "needed to deter
police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections").
13 The Court has had several opportunities to resolve this issue (and related msues), but
has avoided doing so. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 n.9 (1984) (deciding that
police interrogation without Miranda warnings about location of gun permissible under
"public safety" exception; admissibility of gun itself not addressed); Massachusetts v.
White, 439 U.S. 280 (1978) (per curam), aff'g by an equally divided Court Commonwealth
v. White, 371 N.E.2d 777 (Mass. 1977) (ruling that absent valid waiver of Miranda rights,
defendant's statements may not be relied upon to establish probable cause for issuance of
search warrant; tangible evidence found during execution of search warrant suppressed);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (holding that testimony of government
witness discovered as a result of defendant's statements in violation of Miranda admissible).
See also Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922, 922 (1988) (White, 3., and Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (recognizing that the Court has left open the issue of
whether nontestimonial fruits of a Miranda violation must be suppressed).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1982) (deciding that
police officers' interrogation of suspect without Miranda warnings required suppression of
fruit of hI confession, a lead pipe allegedly used to murder his wife); United States v.
Castellana, 488 F.2d 65, 67-68 (5th Cir. 1974) (ruling that police officer's interrogation of
suspect without Miranda warnings about existence and location of gun required suppression
of weapon), vacated in part, 500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane) (holding that police
officer's interrogation without Miranda warnings about location of gun was justified by
concerns for public safety); United States v. Hamson, 265 F Supp. 660, 662 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (deciding that police officers' failure to read Miranda warnings required suppression
of fruits of defendants' statements, including gambling materials); Exparte Yarber, 375 So.
2d 1231, 1234-35 (Ala. 1979) (ruling that police officers' interrogation without Miranda
warnings required suppression of bullet discovered as a result of defendant's confession);
People v. Vigil, 489 P.2d 588, 590 (Colo. 1971) (en bane) (holding that police officer's
failure to advise defendant of his right to have retained or appointed counsel present at the
interrogation required suppression of physical evidence discovered as a result of confession,
including an electric shaver and charger, a stereo record player and records, a check and
clothing); State v. Lekas, 442 P.2d 11, 19-20 (Kan. 1968) (deciding that parole officer's
interrogation without Miranda warnings required suppression of gun discovered as a result
of defendant's confession; defendant's confession could not be used to support search
warrant for pistol); State v. Preston, 411 A.2d 402, 406-09 (Me. 1980) (ruling that police
officer's interrogation without Miranda warnings required suppression of mattresses
discovered as a result of defendant's statements); State v. Greene, 572 P.2d 935, 942-43
(N.M. 1977) (agreeing "in principle" that physical fruits of confessions in violation of
Miranda must be suppressed); State v. Mitchell, 155 S.E.2d 96, 99 (N.C. 1967) (holding
that police officer's failure to advise defendant of right to remain silent required suppression
of evidence regarding victim's pocketbook which was discovered as a result of defendant's
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Elstad,15 the trend has been decidedly in favor of a'dmissibility 16 In Elstad, the
Court ruled that a police officer's failure to read the Miranda warnings before a
statement); Noble v. State, 478 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (deciding that
police officers' failure to advise defendant of right to remain silent required suppression of
physical fruits of his statements, including knife and mask used during robbery); State v.
Williams, 249 S.E.2d 758, 764 (W Va. 1978) (ruling that police officers' interrogation
without Miranda warnings required suppression of boots discovered as a result of
defendant's statement). But see Rhodes v. State, 530 P.2d 1199, 1202 (Nev. 1975) (holding
that physical evidence, including a gun and metal fragments, discovered as a result of
confessions obtained m violation of Miranda admissible); cf. Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82,
91 n.8 (Wyo. 1983) (suggesting, without deciding, that Miranda violations should not
require the suppression of nontestimomal evidence).
Courts also applied the poisonous tree doctrine when the police had failed to honor a
suspect's request to remain silent or for counsel and used his statements to discover physical
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404, 407-09 (1st Cir. 1981)
(deciding that customs officer's failure to respect defendant's request for counsel following
incomplete reading of Miranda warnings required suppression of tangible fruits of
interrogation, including airplane, charts and other documents); United States v. Massey,
437 F Supp. 843, 862 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (ruling that FBI agents' failure to honor
defendant's repeated assertions of right to counsel and to remain silent required suppression
of tangible fruits of interrogation); People v. Saiz, 600 P.2d 97, 101 (Colo. App. 1979)
(holding that police officers' failure to honor suspect's request to remain silent following
reading of Miranda warnings a day earlier required suppression of a wallet that was
discovered as a result of oral statements); People v. Paulin, 255 N.E.2d 164, 167 (N.Y.
1969) (deciding that police officer's failure to respect defendant's request for counsel
following reading of Miranda warnings required suppression of tangible fruit of
interrogation, a metal cooking pot allegedly used to murder husband); Commonwealth v.
Leaming, 247 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. 1968) (ruling that police officer's failure to read suspect
the Miranda warnings and to honor request to remain silent and for counsel required
suppression of victim's body discovered as a result of suspect's statements). But see Wilson
v. Zant, 290 S.E.2d 442, 446-48 (Ga. 1982) (holding that police officer's failure to respect
defendant's request for counsel following reading of Miranda warnings did not require
suppression of the nontestimomal fruit of interrogation, a toy gun), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1092 (1982).
Finally, courts applied the poisonous tree doctrine when the police had read the
Miranda warnings, but obtained a confession and tangible fruits in the absence of a valid
waiver of the Miranda rights. See, e.g., People v. Braeseke, 602 P.2d 384, 390-92 (Cal.
1979) (suppressing rifle that police learned about as a result of defendant's confession,
absent valid waiver of Miranda rights), vacated on other grounds, 446 U.S. 932 (1980),
opinion reinstated, 618 P.2d 149 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981); In re
Appeal No. 245 (75) from Circuit Court for Kent County, 349 A.2d 434, 444-47 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1975) (suppressing binoculars that police learned about as a result of defendant's
confession, absent valid waiver of Miranda rights); Commonwealth v. Wideman, 385 A.2d
1334, 1335 (Pa. 1978) (suppressing gun that police discovered as a result of suspect's
confessions, absent valid waiver of Miranda rights).
15 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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suspect's first confession did not require suppression of his second, warned
confession under the poisonous tree doctrine.17 Although Elstad involved
successive confessions, federal and state courts have read the case broadly to
mean that the poisonous tree doctrine is mapplicable when a Miranda violation
produces any derivative evidence.' 8
This Article argues that nontestimomal fruits of a Miranda violation should
be suppressed under the poisonous tree doctrine, unless the prosecution can
show that a recognized exception to the doctrine applies.' 9 If nontestiinomal
fruits are admissible at trial, the police will be rewarded for their misconduct
and thus have a significant incentive to ignore the Miranda warnings. This
undermunes the protections that Miranda afforded to suspects subject to
custodial interrogation. By contrast, the police would be significantly deterred
16 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1047-49 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Barte, 868 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. dented, 493 U.S.
995 (1989); United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1514-19 (6th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 600-01 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 924 (1988); United States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1986), cen.
dened, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987); In re Owen F., 523 A.2d 627, 631-32 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1987), cert. dened, 528 A.2d 1286 (Md. 1987); People v. Holmes, 536 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291
(N.Y App. Div. 1988), appeal dened, 547 N.E.2d 957 (N.Y. 1989); State v. Wethered,
755 P.2d 797, 800-02 (Wash. 1988). But see State v. Gravel, 601 A.2d 678, 682-86 (N.H.
1991) (holding that defendant's statements obtained in violation of Miranda cannot be relied
upon to establish probable cause for issuance of search warrant; tangible evidence found
during execution of search warrant suppressed); State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 241 (Or.
1985) (ruling that police officer's failure to read suspect the Miranda warnings and to honor
his request for assistance of counsel required suppression of physical evidence derived from
suspect's statements, unless evidence was admissible on an independent ground such as the
inevitable discovery doctrine), cert. dened, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986).
17 Eistad, 470 U.S. at 318. For a more detailed discussion of E/stad, see infra notes
118-53 and accompanying text.
18 Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1049; Barte, 868 F.2d at 774; Sangineto-Miranda,
859 F.2d at 1517; Bengivenga, 845 F.2d at 600; aierry, 794 F.2d at 208; Wethered, 755
P.2d at 801-02; In re Owen F., 523 A.2d at 631-32; see infra notes 154-72 and
accompanying text.
19 The Supreme Court has not required suppression of derivative evidence when the
government can show that: (1) the evidence would have been discovered from a source
independent of the illegality, Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537-39 (1988);
Silverthore Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); (2) the evidence
inevitably would have been discovered by independent, lawful means, Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 444 (1984); or (3) the connection between the illegal conduct and the acquisition
of the evidence was so attenuated that the taint of the unlawful acts had dissipated, United
States v. Ceccolim, 435 U.S. 268, 274-75 (1978); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,
341 (1939). In these situations, the Court has observed, exclusion of derivative evidence
would not deter the police from committing nusconduct, but would merely put them m a
worse position than if no illegality had occurred. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443, 445-46.
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from committing Miranda violations if nontestimomal fruits are excluded. They
would know that their failure to read the warnings would result m the
suppression of the suspect's confession and any nontestimomal evidence that is
discovered. This would send an important message to the police that suspects
cannot be exploited for the information necessary to establish their guilt.
This Article begins with an historical review of the Supreme Court's
confession cases prior to Miranda. The evolution of confession law continues
to be relevant today The Court's current approach to Miranda violations and
the poisonous tree doctrine reflects an eagerness to return to the unworkable
standards for determining the admissibility of confessions that existed before,
and beckoned the arrival of, Miranda.
Accordingly, Section I first discusses the different standards existing before
Miranda for excluding coerced confessions, 20 and then examines Miranda and
the considerations which led to that landmark ruling.21 Section II reviews the
recent cases permitting the prosecution to introduce derivative evidence
obtained in violation of Miranda.22 The Article then examines the issue of
whether nontestimomal fruits of a Miranda violation should be admissible at
trial, as presented by the opening example.23
BACKGROUND
I. COERCED CONFESSIONS AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has long recognized that interrogation is an essential
tool of law enforcement. 24 The primary purpose of interrogation is to obtain
information that will further the investigation of a crime, such as the identity of
suspects or the location of incriminating evidence. 25 The police also use
interrogation to secure a confession of guilt from a person who has committed
a crime.26
Despite the importance of interrogation as an investigative tool, the
government's power to question a suspect is not absolute. The Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects a person from being
20 See infra notes 38-62 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 63-90 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 91-192 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 193-319 and accompanying text.
24 -See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
25 CHARLES E. O'HARA & GREGORY L. O'HARA, FrNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESrIGATION 118-19 (1988); ARTHUR S. AUBRY, JR. & RUDOLPH R. CAPUTO,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 24-28 (1980).
26 O'HARA & O'HARA, supra note 25, at 118-19; AUBRY & CAPUTO, supra note 25,
at 24.
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compelled to mcriminate himself.27 In practice, it "operates to allow a citizen
to remain silent when asked a question requiring an merimmatory answer." 28
When the government violates the privilege, it is prohibited from using
compelled statements and any information derived from such statements to
prove a defendant's guilt in a criminal trial.29
The Fifth Amendment privilege reflects a fundamental principle about the
criminal justice system in the United States: The accused shall not be forced to
participate in the establishment of his own guilt. 30 The privilege ensures that
the government does not exploit its superior power over a suspect to compel
him to answer questions that might incriminate himself.3 1 As Chief Justice
Warren observed,
To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require the government "to
shoulder the entire load," to respect the inviolability of the human personality,
dur accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking
to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own
independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it
from Ins own mouth. 32
27 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); Counselnan v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 580-81 (1892). The privilege does not bar the government from using a
confession given voluntarily and free of compelling influences. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 478 (1966); see also United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977)
("Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not
violated by even the most damning admissions.").
2 8 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461. The privilege can be asserted "in any proceeding, civil
or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory." Id. at 444 (and cases
cited therein).
29 Id. at 445, 453; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892). In Counselman, the Court construed
the Fifth Amendment to exclude both compelled statements and their fruits-without the
poisonous tree doctrine being applicable. The motivation behind this "built-rn" derivative
evidence rule was not to discipline the police or to deter future violations of constitutional
rights, but to "maintain intact the practical protection against incrimination that the Court
conceive[d] the privilege to provide." B. James George, Jr., The Fruits of Miranda. Scope
oftlie Exclusonary Rule, 39 U. COLO. L. REV 478, 481 (1967).
As discussed more fully below, this Fifth Amendment derivative evidence rule is not
applicable to Miranda violations. See infra notes 95-153 and accompanying text.
30 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (holding that Fifth Amendment reflects "unwillingness to subject those
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, peijury or contempt").
31 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8.
32 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (citations omitted).
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The privilege also forces the government to establish its case on the basis of
more reliable evidence than the accused's compelled admissions, which are
regarded as an inherently suspect type of proof.33
Although the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-mcrimination
"registers an important advance in the development of our liberty," 34 it has
been applicable to police interrogation only since Miranda v. Arizona.35 Before
1966, the Supreme Court relied on the English common law and, later, a due
process approach to limit police Interrogation. 36 During this period, the Court
developed a fact-sensitive inquiry that focused on the "totality of the
circumstances" surrounding the interrogation to determine whether a suspect's
confession was Involuntary 37
A. The Road to Miranda: Involuntary Confessions and the Totality of the
Circumstances Standard
The Supreme Court's introduction to confessions came in a series of cases
arising from lower federal courts. These cases laid the groundwork for the fact-
specific, due process approach that eventually dominated the law of confessions
prior to Miranda.
1. Confessions in Federal Court
In its first confession case in 1884, the Supreme Court adopted the English
common-law rule which excluded confessions that were induced by a promise
of benefit or the threat of harm.38 The common-law rule, which had evolved to
33 EDWARD W CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 118, at 287 (3d ed. 1984);
see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (holding that Fifth Amendment
reflects "distrust of self-deprecatory statements").34 Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).
35 Miranda was not the first case to apply the Fifth Amendment to police interrogation.
In 1897, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment was a significant limitation on
police interrogation. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-44 (1897). But the Bran
rationale was quickly abandoned and did not reappear until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964), when the Fifth Amendment was held applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 3; see mnfia note 63. "And not until the
Miranda decision in 1966 was this constitutional provision once more accorded full
recognitiorL in confession cases at the federal level." OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE
SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 26 (1973) (footnote omitted).
36 See infra notes 38-62 and accompanying text. In the early 1940s, the Court also
looked to its own supervisory power over the admimstration of criminal justice m federal
courts to exclude confessions in federal cases. See infra note 46.
37 See znfra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
38 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884). The Court stated that a confession should
be excluded where it
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prevent the introduction of unreliable confessions, assumed that a person
subject to promises or threats would make a false statement to gain favor from
authorities or to prevent further compulsion.3 9
Thirteen years later, the Court's approach to confessions appeared to
change. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
mcrimination was the appropriate basis for excluding a coerced confession. 40
While reaffirming that confessions elicited by threats or promises were
improper, the Court said that the privilege reflected a broader standard
requiring consideration of the coercive forces inherent m official
interrogation. 41
appears to have been made either m consequence of inducements of a temporal nature,
held out by one m authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or
promise by or m the presence of such person, wluch, operating upon the fears or hopes
of the accused, m reference to the charge, deprives him of that freedom of will or self-
control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.
Id. Cases decided the next two years followed Hopt and applied the common-law rule.
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621-24 (1896); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S.
355, 357 (1896); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1895). In keeping with the
inducement theory, the Court refused to find a confession to be per se involuntary when a
suspect was not provided counsel or warned of his right to remain silent. Wilson, 162 U.S.
at 624.
39 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 822 (3d ed. 1940); The King v. Warickshall,
168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B. 1783). However, the fruits of an inadmissible confession
under the common law were admissible at trial. Wanckshall, 168 Eng. Rep. at 235; see also
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W 681 (Ky. 1922). Indeed, if the fruits tended to
show that the confession was reliable, both the confession and the nontestimomal fruits were
admissible. WIGMORE, supra, at §§ 856-59; Note, Developments in the Laiv-Confesszons,
79 HARV L. REv 935, 1028 (1966) [hereinafter Confessions].
Prior to the emergence of the common-law rule in the latter part of the eighteenth
century, confessions were admissible at trial without regard to how they were obtained.
Confessions, supra, at 954. Even confessions extracted by torture were not excluded. E.M.
Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incnrirnation, 34 MINN. L. REv 14-15, 18 (1949).
For an historical discussion of the common-law rule, see Confessions, supra, at 954-59.
40 Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
41 Id. at 544-45, 548, 558. The privilege, the Court concluded, "was in its essence
comprehensive enough to exclude all manifestations of compulsion, whether arising from
torture or from moral causes." Id. at 548. The Court also observed that "the generic
language of the [Fifth] Amendment was but a crystallization of the [English common-law]
doctrine as to confessions, well settled when the Amendment was adopted "Id. at 543.
Several commentators have argued that this assertion is erroneous. WIGMORE, supra note
39, § 823, at 250 n.5 ("[T]here never was any histoncal connection between the
constitutional clause and the confession-doctrine."); Charles T. McCorrmck, 7he Scope of
Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX. L. REV 447, 453 (1938). While the common-
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The Supreme Court quickly abandoned the Fifth Amendment as a basis for
declaring confessions madmissible.42 Although the Court's reliance on a
constitutional standard was short-lived, the Court began to move toward a due
process approach for judging confessions in the early twentieth century 43 That
approach focused on the abusive methods used to extort a confession and the
suspect's ability to give a voluntary statement in the face of such tactics. 44 At
the same time, the Court abandoned the English common-law rule, with its
emphasis on the probative value of a confession. 45
The emergent due process approach to federal confession cases would have
its greatest impact on the development of state confession standards, for the
Court did not again review a federal confession until the early 19 40s.46 By that
law rule and the privilege appear to have developed separately, recent research indicates
that both were motivated by the same concerns, and the rule may be an offshoot of the
privilege. See LEONARD LEvY, CONSTrTUTIONAL OPINIONS, 206-07 (1986); LEONARD
LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIINATION
325-32, 495 n.43 (1968); see also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583 n.25 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
42 For instance, m Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912), the Court held that
the privilege did not bar admission of a confession from a suspect who was not warned of
his right to remain silent. Id. at 313-14. The Court also ruled during this period that the
privilege was not applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908). Twimng was later
overruled in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). See infra note 63.
43 See Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
44 Id. at 14-15 ("In the federal courts, the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by
establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat. A
confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made.").
45 See STEPHENS, supra note 35, at 28.
46 The Supreme Court next considered a confession in a federal case in McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). However, the Court did not rely on Ziang or the self-
incrimination clause, but instead looked to the statutory requirements for prompt appearance
after arrest. See 18 U.S.C. § 595 (former 5 U.S.C. § 300a). The Court ruled that a
confession obtained during an unnecessary delay in bringing a suspect before a judicial
officer was inadmissible. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 342-45. Because the prompt-appearance
statutes provided no sanction for noncompliance, the Court based its new exclusionary rule
on its own "supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts." Id. at 341. Although Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court did not rest on a
finding that the confessions were untrustworthy or extracted by improper methods, Is
opinmon was clearly motivated by a concern for coercive interrogation practices. Id. at 343-
44.
In later cases, the Court applied the McNabb exclusionary rule to violations of Rule
5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was promulgated in 1946 to replace
the prompt-appearance statutes. Rule 5(a) provides that an officer making an arrest must
take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available magistrate.
See Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948) (holding that confession obtained during
30-hour delay in appearance before committing officer was madmssible); Mallory v.
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time, the due process approach was well established m state confession cases
and widely assumed to apply equally to federal prosecutions. 47
2. Confessions in State Court
Having laid the groundwork for the due process approach m federal cases,
the Supreme Court had little difficulty finding a basis for excluding involuntary
confessions m cases arising from state courts. When the first state case
appeared m 1936, the Court looked to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to exclude confessions extorted from three illiterate
black men through brutality and torture.48 The Court found that the state's use
of the extorted confessions was "revolting to the sense of justice" and
constituted a "clear denial of due process." 49
For the next three decades, the Supreme Court relied exclusively on the
Due Process Clause to exclude involuntary confessions mn state cases. 50 As
police brutality declined and psychological interrogation techniques were
employed, the Court was called upon to invalidate subtler forms of coercion.51
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (holding that confession obtained during unnecessary
delay m appearance before committing magistrate was inadmissible); cf. United States v.
Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944) (holding that confession obtained immediately following arrest
and before delay becomes unlawfiul was admissible).
The McNabb rule was not based on any constitutional provision and thus did not apply
to the states. See McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340-41; Upshaw, 335 U.S. at 414 n.2; see also
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 600-01 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., announcing the
judgment of the Court). The rule dominated the law of confessions in the federal courts until
the Court m Miranda ruled that the Fifth Amendment pnvilege against self-incrimination
was applicable to police interrogation.
In 1968, Congress altered the McNabb rule. A voluntary confession is not madmissible
solely because of a delay m bringing a suspect before a magistrate if the confession was
given withm six hours of arrest or detention. Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title II, § 701(a), 82 Stat.
210 (1968), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
47 STEPHENS, supra note 35, at 28.
48 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).49 Id. at 286.
50 Many of the early cases following Brown showed clear instances of coercion. See,
e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (examnng incommunicado detention in solitary
confinement and repeated interrogations late into the evening over a period of five days);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (ruling on incommunicado detention and
repeated interrogations over 36 hours by relays of police officers and investigators); White
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940) (examining repeated interrogations of illiterate farmhand in
the woods after removal from jail); see also Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
51 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (invalidating
incommunicado interrogation over 16 hours and access to counsel and wife conditioned on
providing confession); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (invalidating eight or
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Eventually, the Justices developed a fact-specific approach to assess whether a
suspect's confession was voluntary 52 This approach focused on the "totality of
the circumstances" surrounding the interrogation.5 3 Several factors were
particularly important in this analysis: the suspect's physical and mental
condition; 54 the length and conditions of detention and interrogation; 55 and the
suspect's ability to communicate with legal counsel, relatives or friends.5 6
Like the federal confession cases, the rationale of the state cases changed
over time. Early on, the Court ruled that confessions should be excluded only
when they were unreliable. 57 As the Court's membership changed in later
years, the Justices increasingly excluded confessions (whether reliable or not)
when they were obtained through police musconduct.58 In 1961, the
"trustworthiness" rationale was finally abandoned. 59 The Court ruled that
confessions obtained by "impermissible methods" could not be used at trial,
ime-hour interrogation of mentally impaired suspect in closely confined room); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (invalidating nighttime interrogation over eight-hour
period of foreign-born man with history of emotional instability); see also Hams v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
52 See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-42 (1966); Haynes, 373
U.S. at 513; Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954). See generally Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-27 (1973); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02
(1961) (Frankfurter, I., announcing the judgment of the Court).
53 See, e.g., Davis, 384 U.S. at 741-42; Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513-14; Leyra, 347
U.S. at 558. See generally Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-27; Culombe, 367 U.S. at 601-02.
54 See, e.g., Davis, 384 U.S. at 742 (suspect was "an impoverished Negro with a third
or fourth grade education"); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (suspect was a
14-year-old boy); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441 (1961) (suspect was a 19-year-old with
low intelligence); see also Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 200 (1960); Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-22 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958).
55 See, e.g., Davis, 384 U.S. at 752 (incommumcado interrogation over a period of 16
days); Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513 (incommumcado interrogation over 16 hours and access to
counsel and wife conditioned on providing confession); Watts, 338 U.S. at 52-53
(incommuicado detention in solitary confinement and repeated interrogations late into the
evemng over a period of. five days); see also Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 153; Chambers, 309
U.S. at 238-40.
56 See, e.g., Davis, 384 U.S. at 740-41 (police fail to advise suspect of right to
counsel); Haynes, 373 U.S. at 514 (police condition access to counsel and wife on suspect
providing confession); Spano, 360 U.S. at 322-23 (suspect's requests to contact retained
attorney rejected); see also Watts, 338 U.S. at 53; Chambers, 309 U.S. at 231.
57 See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953); see STEPHENS, supra note
35, at 108-13.
58 See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964); Blackburn, 361 U.S. at
207; Spano, 360 U.S. at 320-21; Rochln v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952); see Yale
Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of Cnnunal Procedure: A Reply to Professor
Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF 537, 543, 546 (199Q).
59 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
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even when "independent corroborating evidence left little doubt of the truth of
what the defendant had confessed." 60 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
majority, said: -
[C]onvictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are
mvoluntary, i.e., the product of coercion, either physical or psychological,
cannot stand. This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but
because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle m the
enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatonal and not an
inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt by
evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its
charge against an accused out of his own mouth. 6 1
The Court thus established that involuntary confessions were inadmissible not
because they were lacking in probative value, but because they were "the
product of constitutionally impermissible methods in their mducement."62
B. Miranda v Arizona
By the early 1960s, the Supreme Court had developed a fact-sensitive, due
process approach for judging confessions. That approach focused on the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the police interrogation to determine whether
a confession was voluntary 63
60 1d. at 541.
61 Id. at 540-41.
62 Id. at 541.
63 The early 1960s also witnessed the reemergence of the Fifth Amendment as a
possible basis for excluding confessions. In 1964, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, discussed over six decades earlier in Brain
v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), was applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). Although
the admissibility of a confession was not at issue, the Court took the opportunity to reassess
its federal and state jurisprudence forbidding the use of coerced confessions in criminal
prosecutions. Reinterpreting earlier federal and state cases, the Court concluded that state
confession standards had evolved to reflect the same standard applied in federal
prosecutions since Brain-a voluntariness standard based on the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 6-
8. Under this standard, the
constitutional inquiry [was] not whether the conduct of state officers m dbtamng the
confession was shocking, but whether the confession was "free and voluntary; that is,
[it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct
or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper
influence. "In other words the person must not have been compelled to incrminate
himself.
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However, many courts had difficulty applying a "voluntariness"
standard. 64 Because the voluntariness standard relied heavily on the "totality of
the circumstances" of each case, trial courts were given little guidance m
resolving confession claims.65 As a result, they "were virtually invited to give
weight to their subjective preferences when performing the elusive task of
balancing." 66 Appellate courts did not fare any better, because they were either
too remote from the events to second-guess the lower courts or reluctant to
release convicted criminals. 67 Given the vagueness of the voluntariness
Id. at 7 (citations omitted). The shift to a Fifth Amendment standard, the Court noted,
reflected that the criminal justice system was "accusatonal, not inquisitorial," and that
federal and state officials could not "by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of
his own mouth." Id. at 7-8.
Malloy resurrected Brain and merged the federal and state lines of authority into one
standard based on the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause. The Court continued to
examine the totality of the circumstances in assessing whether a confession was voluntary,
and to focus on the methods used to interrogate suspects.
If Malloy provided clarification about the standard governing confessions, the Court's
1964 ruling in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964), created confusion by
suggesting that the Sixth Amendment, as well as the Fifth Amendment, rmght be the
appropriate basis to exclude a confession. The Court held that the defendant's confession
must be suppressed because it was obtained in the absence of counsel and without effective
warning of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Id.
64 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963) ("The line between proper
and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at
best, a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is necessary to make
fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the
mind and will of an accused."); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959) ("[A]s the
methods used to extract confessions [become] more sophisticated, our duty to enforce
federal constitutional protections does not cease. It only becomes more difficult because of
the more delicate judgments to be made."); Geoffrey R. Stone, 7he Miranda Doctrine in the
Burger Court, 1977 SuP CT. REv 99, 102 (1977) ("[D]espite the apparent simplicity of
the 'voluntariness' concept on its face, it proved to be highly subtle and elusive, involving a
delicate balancing of a whole complex of variables concerning the behavior of the police
and the subjective attitudes of the suspect."); Confessions, supra note 39, at 963 ("[IThe fact
of voluntariness is extremely difficult to find, since it represents not an observable physical
phenomenon but a characterization of varying concatenations of facts.").
65 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV 865, 869-70
(1981). See also Yale Kainisar, A Dissent froni the Miranda Dissents: Some Commaents on
the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntanness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv 59, 94-
104 (1966);.Robert-M. Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized,
56 CAL. L. REV 579, 602 (1968).
66 Schulhofer, supra note 65, at 870.
67 Id. The Supreme Court's decision in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961),
is a prime example of the difficulty courts had in resolving voluntariness questions. Justice
Frankfurter announced the Court's judgment suppressing.an involuntary confession. He
authored a lengthy. opinion on the principles governing police interrogation, which only
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standard, there were few useful precedents to guide future judicial
decisionmaking.
Similarly, the police were given insufficient guidance under the
voluntariness standard about permissible interrogation practices.68 There was a
fine line between proper methods of questioning a suspect and objectionable
tactics that would overbear the suspect's will.69 Indeed, the standard did not
adequately prevent the police from exerting considerible pressure on suspects,
especially those who were the most vulnerable.70 The standard was particularly
ineffective m deterring the police from using deception and other mampulative
techniques to extract a confession. 71 Indeed, by permitting the police to use
some pressure, the standard did not totally eliminate physical brutality and
other forms of coercion. 72
The failure of the voluntariness standard to prevent police abuses was due
m large part to the nature of the confrontations between police officers and
suspects. Because suspects were frequently interrogated in isolation, trial courts
were forced to resolve "swearing contests" between interrogators and suspects
about events that occurred m secret. 73 Given the institutional bias against
defendants, "there was next to nothing to prevent judges and juries from
systematically resolving credibility issues m favor of the police." 74
In 1966, the Supreme Court attempted to address these problems m its
landmark ruling in Miranda v. Arzona.75 Expanding constitutional restrictions
Justice Stewart joined. Justices Harlan, Clark and Whittaker, while agreeing with the
principles delineated m Justice Frankfurter's opinon, construed those principles as requiring
a result m the case exactly opposite from the one he reached. Overall, the case produced
five opimons-none commanding a majority.
68 Schulhofer, supra note 65, at 869.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 871-72.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 872.
73 Id. at 870-71; see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
74 Schulhofer, supr4 note 65, at 871.
75 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Ernesto Miranda, arrested on rape charges, was taken to the
police station and interrogated in isolation. Id. at 491-92. He was never informed of his
right to remain silent or to have an attorney present during the interrogation. Id. at 492.
After two hours, Miranda gave a written confession. Id. at 491-92. Over objection, his
written confession was admitted into evidence, and the police interrogators testified about
the prior oral confession he made during the interrogation. Id. at 492. Miranda was found
guilty of kidnapping and rape and sentenced to 20 to 30 years ia prison. The Supreme Court
of Ahizona affirmed the conviction on appeal. Id. (citing State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721
(Ariz. 1965) (en bane)). Miranda's case is discussed in full detail in LIVA BAKER,
MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITCS (1983).
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on police practices, the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination was fully applicable to custodial interrogation because such
questioning contained "inherently compelling pressures which work[ed] to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely "76 To combat these pressures and to ensure a
full opportunity to exercise the privilege, the police were required to warn a
suspect m custody,77 prior to any questioning,78 that he had the right to remain
The Court also reviewed confessions in three companion cases, Vignera v. New York,
Westover v. United States, and Califorma v. Stewart. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-57, 493-
99.
76 Miranda, 385 U.S. at 467. The Court concluded that all the principles embodied in
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to informal compulsion
exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. Id. at 461. The Court
observed:
An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by
antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above
cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the
compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than
in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to
guard against intimidation or trickery.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Court noted that prior judicial precedent, such as Brain v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), and Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1
(1924), clearly established the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to
incommumcado interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461-63.
The Court also noted that Congress's adoption of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the Court's effectuation of that rule in McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), had enabled the
Court in the past quarter century to avoid reaching the constitutional issues in dealing with
federal interrogations. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463. These supervisory rules, the Court said,
were nonetheless responsive to the same considerations of Fifth Amendment policy that
faced the Court as to the states. Id. The Court emphasized that, although it was setting forth
new rules for federal interrogations, the McNabb-Mallory rule continued to be applicable.
Id. at 463 n.32.
77 The police must read the warnings when a suspect is arrested or significantly
deprived of his freedom of action. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 428 (1984). In
determining whether a suspect is in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom, the
"relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood
his situation." Id. at 442.
78 The Miranda warnings are required before express questionig and "any words or
actions on.the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incrunminating response from
the suspect." Rhode Island v. Inms, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnotes omitted). The
latter portion of this definition focuses on the suspect's perceptions, rather than on the intent
of the police. Id.
[Vol. 53:805
MIRANDA AND NONTESTIMONIAL FRUIT
silent; that anything he said could be used as evidence against him; that he had
the right to the presence of an attorney during the interrogation; and that if he
could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for hun. 79 If the police
failed to read the warnings, the suspect's statements m response to questioning
were presumed to be coerced, and the prosecution could not use them at trial
without violating the Fifth Amendment.80
The Supreme Court emphasized that, although the Constitution did not
require "any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the
interrogation process," the police must give the warnings until other
procedures were shown to be as effective in apprising the accused of his Fifth
Amendment rights.81 Each warning served a particular purpose. The warning
79 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Court set forth the procedures once the warinngs
had been given. If the suspect indicated in any manner, at any time prior to or during
questiomng, that he wanted to remain silent, the interrogation had to cease. Id. at 473-74.
Any statements taken after the person invoked his privilege could not be other than the
product of compulsion. Id. at 474. If the suspect stated that he wanted an attorney, the
interrogation had to cease until an attorney was present. Id. At that time, the suspect "must
have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any
subsequent questiomng." Id. If the individual could not obtain an attorney and he indicated
that he wanted one before speaking to police, the police must respect his decision to remain
silent. Id.
A suspect could waive is Fifth Amendment rights and his right to retained or
appointed counsel and agree to talk. The waiver would be valid only if it was made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Id. at 444. For instance, a suspect's failure to ask
for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver of the right to counsel. Id. at 470. Absent a valid
waiver, the suspect's statements could not be introduced into evidence in the prosecution's
case-m-chief. Id. at 444.
The Supreme Court has since held that a suspect need not be aware of all the crimes
about wich he may be questioned to provide a valid waiver of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1987). Nor must he know and
understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the privilege. Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 422 (1986).
80 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 458.
81 Id. at 467. In all four cases, the Court ruled that the defendants' statements were
obtained under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 491-99. While the defendants'
statements may not have been involuntary in "traditional terms," the Court concluded, the
potential for compulsion was "forcefully apparent." Id. at 457 In each case, the defendant
was "thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation
procedures." Id. In none of the cases "did the officers undertake to afford appropriate
safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the
product of free choice." Id.
Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White dissented, arguing in three separate opimons
that the Court should adhere to the traditional "voluntanness" test, which focused on the
"totality of the circumstances" surrounding the interrogation. Id. at 499-504 (Clark, J.,
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that a suspect had a right to remain silent was the key to overcoming the
compelling pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.82 The warning informed
the suspect of his Fifth Amendment right and his ability to exercise it at any
time during the interrogation.8 3 It also demonstrated that the interrogators were
required to honor a request to remain silent. 84 The warning that the suspect's
statements could be used against him conveyed the serious consequences of
abandoning his Fifth Amendment right-thereby ensuring a "real
understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege"-and indicated that his
interrogators were adversaries not acting in his interest. 85 Knowledge of the
right to have counsel present at the interrogation (and to have one appointed if
indigent)86 reinforced the right to remain silent and assured the accused that he
was truly m a position to exercise it.87
Miranda marked a turning point in the development of confession law The
Fifth Amendment became a significant check on police practices and the
primary basis for judging the admissibility of confessions in federal and state
courts. The Court abandoned the "old" due process voluntariness standard
which emphasized the "totality of the circumstances" of each case. The new
voluntariness standard was effectuated through bright-line rules governing
police interrogation. While this new standard did not completely eliminate the
failings of the old one,88 it provided needed guidance to police about
dissenting); id. at 504-26 (Harlan, J:, with whom Stewart J., and White, J., join,
dissenting); id. at 526-45 (White, J., with whom Harlan J., and Stewart, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan argued that the voluntanness test was an "elaborate, sophisticated, and
sensitive approach to admissibility of confessions," which was "'judicial' in its treatment of
one case at a time, flexible in its ability to respond to the endless mutations of fact
presented, and ever more familiar to the lower courts." Id. at 508 (citation omitted).
82 Id. at 468-69.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 468.
85 Id. at 469.
86 The Court concluded that suspects must be apprised of the right to appointed
counsel if indigent. "Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult
with counsel would often be understood as meamng only that he can consult with a lawyer if
he has one or has the funds to obtain one." Id. at 473.
87 Id. at 469-73. The presence of counsel at the interrogation, the Court noted, may
well serve several subsidiary functions. With a lawyer present, the likelihood that the police
would practice coercion was reduced; if coercion was nevertheless exercised, the lawyer
could testify to it in court. Id. at 470. If the suspect decided to talk to his interrogators, the
assistance of counsel could "mitigate the dangers of untrustworthmess." Id. The lawyer
could help to guarantee that the accused gave a fully accurate statement to the police, and
that the statement was rightly reported by the prosecution at trial. Id.
88 See Schulhofer, supra note 65, at 879-84.
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permissible interrogation practices. 89 It also provided better safeguards for
suspects and a more focused framework for judicial review 90
I. MRANDA VIOLATIONS AND THE POISONOUS TREE DOCrRINE
While the Supreme Court m Miranda clarified the circumstances m which
a confession could be admitted at trial, the case did not address whether
evidence discovered as a result of an unwarned confession must be excluded as
well.91 One sentence in Chief Justice Warren's opinion, if taken out of context,
suggests that derivative evidence must be suppressed, 92 and Justice Clark m
dissent protested that the majority opinion required derivative evidence to be
89 Id. at 883.
90 Id. Since 1966, the Supreme Court's membership has changed and a more
conservative majority has narrowed Miranda. For instance, the Court now recognizes a
"public safety" exception to the Miranda requirements, excusing a police officer's failure to
read the warnings when the public's safety is of concern. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 655-56 (1984). The Court also permits the government to use a confession obtained m
violation of Miranda to impeach a defendant's trial testimony. Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
Nonetheless, the Court has never abandoned the critical holding of Miranda. A
suspect's statements m response to police questioning, if not preceded by warnings apprising
the suspect of his Fifth Amendment rights, are presumptively coerced and cannot be
admitted in the government's case-m-chief in support of conviction. See, e.g., Pennsylvania
v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985).
Indeed, the Court reinforced Miranda's protections in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 484-85 (1981), ruling that once the accused requests the assistance of counsel, the
police must terminate the interrogation and cannot reinitiate questioning until counsel has
been made available to him and is present. Edwards is "designed to prevent the police from
badgering a defendant into waiving Ins previously asserted Miranda rights," Michigan v.
Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990), and "ensures that any statement made in subsequent
interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures." Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct.
486, 489 (1990). Edwards "implements the protections of Miranda in practical and
straightforward terms." Id. at 490.
91 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966) ("[W]e deal with the admissibility of
statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and
the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.")
(emphasis added).
92 Id. at 479 ("But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evdence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). One state court has relied on the Court's dicta
to exclude physical evidence discovered as a result of statements in violation of Miranda.
Commonwealth v. Learning, 247 A.2d 590,594 (Pa. 1968).
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excluded. 93 Scholars debated the issue shortly after Miranda was decided, but
they were unable to reach a consensus. 94
Since 1966, the Supreme Court has considered whether derivative evidence
obtained in violation of Miranda should be suppressed on only two occasions-
m Michigan v. Tucker 95 and in Oregon v. Elstad.96 As explained below, the
Court not only ruled that a Miranda violation was not a Fifth Amendment
violation-thereby precluding a "built-in" Fifth Amendment derivative
evidence rule for Miranda violations97-but it also limited the application of
the poisonous tree doctrine to Miranda violations. Although both cases
involved the admissibility of testimonial fruits, the Court strongly intimated
that nontestimonial fruits would not be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree.
93 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 500 (Clark, I., dissenting) ("The Court further holds that
failure to follow the new procedures requires inexorably the exclusion of any statement by
the accused, as well as the fruits thereof."). But see d. at 545 (White, J., dissenting)
("Today's decision leaves open such questions as whether nontestimonial evidence
introduced at trial is the fruit of statements made during a prohibited interrogation ").
94 Compare HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 279 (1967) (arguing that Miranda
did not decide the issue), George, supra note 29, at 487-90, and Pitler, supra note 65, at
612 & n.168 ("Miranda did not explicitly concern itself with the fruits of a confession
obtained absent the required warnings.") with Justice Herbert B. Cohen, Derivative
Evidence-A Part of the Law of the Land, in A NEw LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: ESCOBEDO-
THE SECOND ROUND 135-43 (B. James George, Jr. ed., 1967) [hereinafter NEW LOOK AT
CONFESSIONSI (arguing that Miranda requires suppression of evidentiary fruits), NEV
LOOK AT CONFESsIONs, supra, at 147-51 (remarks of Yale Kamisar) and Robert J. Terry,
Note, Miranda's Effect on the Adussibility of Evidence Obtained by Aid of an Involuntary
Confesswn, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 133, 140-43 (1966). A panel discussion of this issue among
legal scholars, judges, prosecutors and others is contained in NEw LOOK AT CONFESSIONS,
supra, at 145-64.
Suppression of derivative evidence would have been consistent with the Court's
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment in 1966. By that time, the Court had already ruled
(albeit outside the context of police interrogation) that the privilege prohibited the
government from using compelled statements and their fruits as evidence of guilt. See, e.g.,
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 586 (1892). Because the basis of the Miranda exclusionary rule was the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination clause, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 460-67, 478-79, a strong
argument could have been made that the 1966 ruling by logical extension also required
exclusion of evidentiary fruits. See George, supra note 29, at 489.
The Supreme Court has never accepted such a broad reading of Miranda, however. In
fact, the Court no longer considers a Miranda violation to be a Fifth Amendment violation.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n.1 (1985) ("[A] simple failure to
administer Miranda warnings is not in itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment."). Elstad is
discussed znfra notes 118-53 and accompanying text.
95 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
96 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
97 See supra note 29.
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A. Miranda Violations and Testimonial Fruit
1. Micugan v Tucker
In Michigan v. Tucker, the Supreme Court considered whether the
testimony of a government witness should be excluded because the police had
learned of his identity by questioning the defendant without fully complying
with Miranda.98 Tucker was arrested for rape and brought to the police station
for questionng. 99 Before the interrogation began, the police informed Tucker
that he had the right to remain silent and that any statements he made could be
used against him m court.100 The defendant was also asked whether he wanted
an attorney, and he replied that he did not.' 0 However, the police failed to
advise Tucker that a lawyer would be furmshed for him free of charge if he
could not pay for one.102 Although the interrogation occurred before Miranda,
the ruling was applicable because the defendant's trial took place afterwards. 103
When Tucker was questioned about the rape, he replied that he had been
with Robert Henderson and then at home asleep when the crime occurred. 104
The police contacted Henderson to confirm the defendant's story, but
Henderson discredited Tucker's account. 105 Henderson testified for the
government and Tucker was convicted of rape.' 0 6 Tucker argued on appeal that
98 417 U.S. 433, 435 (1974).




103 Id. at 435 (citing Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)).
104 Id. at 436.
105 Id. at 436-37 Henderson acknowledged that Tucker had been with him on the
night of the crime, but said that Tucker had left at a relatively early period. Id. at 436.
Henderson also told police that he saw Tucker the following day and asked him at that time
about the scratches on his face-whether he "'got hold of a wild one or something.'" Id.
Tucker replied, "'[Slomething like that.'" Id. at 436-37 Then, Henderson asked, "'[Wrho
it was'"; Tucker responded, "'[S]ome woman lived the next block over,'" adding, "'She is
a widow woman,' or words to that effect.'" Id. at 437 (citations omitted).
106 Id. at 437 Tucker was sentenced to 20 to 40 years in prison. Id. Both the
Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Id.
(citing People v. Tucker, 172 N.W.2d 712 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); People v. Tucker, 189
N.W.2d 290 (Mich. 1971)). He later sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. The
district court concluded "[r]eluctantly" that Henderson's testimony could not be admitted
because the police had learned of his identity only through Tucker's unwarned answers. Id.
(citing Tucker v. Johnson, 352 F Supp. 266, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1972)). The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the grant of the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 435 (citing Tucker v. Johnson, 480
F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1973)).
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Henderson's testimony should have been excluded as violative of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the police discovered
the witness's identity by questioning Tucker without fully complying with
Miranda.10 7
The Supreme Court ruled that the government could use Henderson's
testimony iOa Initially, the Court found that the police did not deprive Tucker
of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, "but rather failed
to make available to him the full measure of procedural safeguards associated
with that right since Miranda."10 9 The Court noted that the record lacked any
evidence that the defendant's statements were coerced, particularly because the
police had read several of the Miranda warnings to the accused. 110 The Court
added that Tucker would not have been exposed to legal sanctions, such as the
threat of contempt, had he chosen to remain silent.I
Faced simply with an "inadvertent disregard" of Miranda's "prophylactic
standards," 112 the Court concluded that suppression of the witness's testimony
would not serve the purpose of an exclusionary rule and deter future police
misconduct. 113 The police officers had fully complied with the constitutional
principles applicable at the time of the Interrogation' 14 and thus did not
willfully or negligently fail to read all the Miranda warnings. The Court
observed that suppression of the testimony in these circumstances would not
"instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts,
a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused."1 5
107 Id. at 438-39.
108 Id. at 450.
109 Id. at 444.
110 Id. at 444-45. The Court specifically noted that the police had warned Tucker that
he had the right to remain silent, that any evidence taken could be used against him, and
that he could speak to an attorney. Id.
I Id. at 445.
112 Id. at 445-46.
113 Id. at 446-47 The Court noted that the rationale of the exclusionary rule-"to
deter future unlawful police conduct"-would seem applicable to the Fifth Amendment
context in a proper case. Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).
114 Id. at 447 Those rules were enunciated m Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), which required police to inform a suspect of the right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation. Complying with Escobedo, the police asked Tucker if he wanted to
speak to counsel and he answered that he did not. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447
(1974).
115 Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 The Court also concluded that the second rationale for
the exclusionary rule-"protection of the courts from reliance on untrustworthy evidencer-
would not be served by excluding Henderson's testimony. Id. at 448-49 (footnote omitted).
There was no reason to believe that Henderson's testimony was untrustworthy as a result of
Tucker not being advised of his right to appointed counsel. Id. at 448-49. Henderson was
not subject to custodial pressures, and he was available at trial and subject to cross-
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examination. Id. at 449. Tucker's "counsel fully used tins opportunity, suggesting that
Henderson's character was less than exemplary" and that the police had offered him
incentives to testify against Tucker. Id. Thus, the Court concluded, Henderson's testimony
was subject to the "normal testing process of an adversary trial." Id.
The Court rejected the suggestion that derivative evidence should be excluded "in
recognition of the -imperative of judicial integrity.'" Id. at 450 n.25 (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)). The Court concluded that tins rationale was
really an assimilation of the deterrence and trustworthiness rationales and did not provide an
"independent basis" for excluding derivative evidence. Id.
Justice Brennan, together with Justice Marshall, concurred m the judgment. Id. at 453
(Brennan, I., with whom Marshall, I., joins, concurring). Justice Brennan argued that,
while Miranda itself prohibited all fruits of statements made without proper warnings, the
decision should be retroactively applied only to those cases in winch the fruits were obtained
as a result of post-Miranda interrogations. Id. at 458. Justice Brennan concluded that
exclusion of fruits was "necessary to give full effect to the purposes and policies underlying
the Miranda rules and to its holding that 'unless and until [the Miranda] warnings and
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evdence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against [the defendant].'" Id. at 460 n.5 (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)). The majority disputed Justice Brennan's reading of
Miranda, concluding that the decision did not reach the issue of admissibility of fruits
derived from unwarned statements. Id. at 452 n.26. In their view, Justice Brennan's
"method of disposition [was] to determine in the present case the retroactivity of a holding
winch the Court ha[d] yet to make." Id.
Justice White concurred m the judgment, noting specifically that Miranda "did not deal
vith the admissibility of evidence derived from m-custody admissions obtained without the
pecified warnings." Id. at 460 (White, I., concurring). He would not extend Miranda's
irophylactic scope to bar the testimony of third parties even though they had been
liscovered by means of unwarned admissions. Id. at 461. He concluded, "the arguable
enefits from excluding such testimony by way of possibly deterring police conduct that
ight compel admissions are, m my view, far outweighed by the advantages of having
-levant and probative testimony, not obtained by actual coercion, available at criminal
ials to aid in the pursuit of truth." Id. He added, however, that the "same results would not
cessarily obtain with respect to the fruits of involuntary confessions." Id.
Justice Stewart, concurring, joined the majority's opinion and Justice Brennan's
incurrence. Id. at 453 (Stewart, J., concurring). He believed that the Court's opinion and
stice Brennan's concurrence proceeded along "virtually parallel lines, give or take a
uple of argumentative footnotes." Id.
Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that the Miranda violation was a Fifth Amendment
)lation wich required suppression of all fruits. Id. at 462-64 (Douglas, L, dissenting).
,tice Douglas took issue with the majority's statement that Tucker's interrogation only
parted from the prophylactic standards laid down in Miranda. He said, "Miranda's
rpose was not promulgation of judicially preferred standards for police interrogation, a
iction we are quite powerless to perform; the decision enunciated 'constitutional standards
protection of the privilege' against self-incrimination." Id. at 465-66 (citing Miranda,
IU.S. at 491).
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Tucker was a significant retreat from Miranda. The Court rejected
Miranda's core premise by declaring that a failure to read the Miranda
warnings fully, without more, did not constitute a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 16 More importantly, the Court also refused to apply the
poisonous tree doctrine to a Miranda violation, at least when the police
questioning occurred before Miranda was decided and the officers othervise
complied with the constitutional requirements applicable at the time of the
interrogation. 1 7 The majority stopped short of deciding, however, whether a
total failure to read the Miranda warnings-after Miranda had been decided-
required exclusion of evidentiary fruits.
2. Oregon v. Elstad
The Supreme Court waited a decade before considering the issues left open
in Tucker i1s In Oregon v. Elstad, the Court considered whether a police
officer's failure to read the Miranda warnings before a suspect's first
confession required suppression of a second confession, which he gave after
being fully advised of and waiving his Fifth Amendment rights. 1 9 The police
confronted Elstad at his home with a warrant for his arrest on burglary
116 See David Sonenshem, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends,
13 LoY. U. CIn. L.J. 405, 425-26 (1982); Stone, supra note 64, at 118-19.
117 The Court refused to "resolve the broad question of whether evidence derived
from statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules must be excluded regardless of
when the interrogation took place." Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 (footnote omitted).
118 The Court had an opportunity to consider these issues m New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1984). It was asked to decide whether a police officer's failure to read the
Miranda warnings before questioning a suspect in custody about the location of his gut
required suppression of both his responses and the weapon. However, the Court ruled thal
the officer's questioning was justified m the first instance for reasons of "public safety," d
at 651, 655-66, and thus avoided resolving whether the gun should be suppressed as a fru
of the Miranda violation. Id. at 660 n.9.
Only Justice O'Connor (and Justice Marshall briefly in rebuttal) addressed this issue
Id. at 665-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting m part); d. at 688 n.1
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's opinion is discussed infra notes 173-92 an
accompanying text.
The Court also had an opportunity in 1977 to consider a related issue-whether
defendant's statements in violation of Miranda could be relied upon to establish probab
cause for issuance of a search warrant that uncovered tangible evidence. However, t
Court affirmed the lower court by an equally divided vote. Massachusetts v. White, 4
U.S. 280 (1978), affig by an equally divded Court Commonwealth v. White, 371 N.E..
777 (Mass. 1977).
119 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985).
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charges 120 and questioned him about the crime without reading the Miranda
warnings. 121 Elstad admitted being at the scene of the burglary 122 He was then
taken to police headquarters and was first read the warnings about an hour after
the initial questioning. 123 After Elstad indicated that he understood and wished
to waive his Fifth Amendment rights, he gave an oral confession concerning
his involvement m the burglary 124 He later read and signed a written
confession. 125
The trial court suppressed Elstad's initial oral statement under Miranda,
but admitted his signed confession upon finding that it was given after a
knowing and voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. 126 Elstad was
convicted, 127 but the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed. The court concluded
that the written confession should have been excluded as fruit of the unwarned
confession. 128 Given the brief period separating Elstad's initial oral statement
120 In December 1981, the Gross home was burglarized of art objects and furmshings
valued at $150,000. Id. A witness to the burglary contacted the Polk County Sheriff's office
and implicated Elstad, an 18-year-old neighbor, and a friend of the Gross's teenage son. Id.
121 Id. at 301.
122 Id. Officer Burke asked Elstad if he knew a person by the name of Gross. Elstad
said that he did, adding that he heard there was a robbery at their house. Id. Officer Burke
then told the defendant that he felt he was involved in the robbery. Elstad responded, "Yes,
I was there." Id. (citation omitted). Elstad explained that he knew that the Gross family was
out of town. He had been paid to show several acquaintances how to gain entry into the




125 Id. "The statement was typed, reviewed by [EIstad], read back to hun for
correction, initialed and signed by Elstad and both officers. As an afterthought, Elstad
added and initialed the sentence, 'After leaving the house Robby & I went back to [the] van
& Robby handed me a small bag of grass.'" Id. at 301-02 (citation omitted).
126 Id. at 302. "The [trial court] ruled that the statement, 'I was there,' had to be
excluded because [Elstad] had not been advised of his Miranda rights." Id. As to the second
confession, the trial court concluded:
[HIis written statement was given freely, voluntarily and knowingly by the defendant
after he had waived his nght to remain silent and have counsel present which waiver
was evidenced by the card which the defendant had signed. [It] was not tainted in any
way by the previous brief statement between the defendant and the Sheriff's Deputies
that had arrested him.
Id. (alteration m original) (citation omitted).
127 Elstad received a five-year sentence and was ordered to pay $18,000 in restitution.
Id.
128 Id. at 302-03. The Oregon Court of Appeals identified "the crucial constitutional
inquiry as 'whether there was a sufficient break in the stream of events between [the]
inadrmssible statement and the written confession to insulate the latter statement from the
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and his subsequent confession, the court reasoned, the "'cat was sufficiently
out of the bag to exert a coercive impact on [his] later adnussions.'" 129
The Supreme Court reinstated Elstad's conviction, ruling that his written
confession should not have been suppressed as tainted fruit of the Miranda
violation.i30 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor concluded that a
suspect who makes an incriminating statement without the benefit of Miranda
warnings is not thereafter precluded from providing an admissible, "voluntary"
confession after being informed of and waiving his Miranda rights. 131
Expanding upon the Tucker analysis, the Court first indicated that a police
officer's failure to give the Miranda warnings, without more, did not violate
the Fifth Amendment. 132 The majority indicated that the "prophylactic"
Miranda warnings were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,
but were simply measures to ensure that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-mcrimmation was protected. 133 Given this retreat from Miranda's core
premise, the Court explained the basis for excluding unwamed statements in
the prosecution's case-m-chief. The Miranda exclusionary rule, the Court
noted, swept more broadly than the Fifth Amendment and was triggered even
in the absence of coercion.1 34 An unwarned confession was presumed to be
coerced, but nevertheless could be "voluntary" under the Fifth Amendment. 135
Thus, a defendant could take advantage of the Miranda presumption to exclude
the confession, even though he had suffered no identifiable constitutional
harm. 136
effect of what went before.'" Id. at 303 (alteration m original) (quoting State v. Elstad, 658
P.2d 552, 554 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)).
129 Id. at 303 (quoting Elstad, 658 P.2d at 555). The Oregon court concluded:
Regardless of the absence of actual compulsion, the coercive impact of the
unconstitutionally obtained statement remains, because in a defendant's mmd it has
sealed his fate. It is this impact that must be dissipated in order to make a subsequent
confession admissible. In determining whether it has been dissipated, lapse of time, and
change of place from the original surroundings are the most important considerations.
Id. (quoting Elstad, 658 P.2d at 554). The Oregon Supreme Court declined to accept
review. Id. at 303.
130 Id. at 318.
131 Id.
13 2 Id. at 304-09.
133 Id. at 305.
134 Id. at 306-07; see also id. at 306 n.1 ("A Miranda violation does not constitute
coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring
suppression of all unwarned statements.").
135 Id.
136 Id. at 307
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The Court continued that the Miranda presumption of coercion, although
"irrebuttable" for purposes of the prosecution's case-m-chief, did not require
the fruits to be discarded as "inherently tainted." 137 A broad application of the
poisonous tree doctrine was only necessary, the Court indicated, when the
police committed a Fifth Amendment violation as distinguished from a
Miranda violation-that is, where there was actual coercion or other
circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free
will.138
Because Elstad's unwarned statement was not "actually coerced" under the
Fifth Amendment (even though presumptively coerced under Miranda),139 the
Court found little justification for excluding his subsequent written confession
following the admlnistration of Miranda warnings.1 40 The Miranda warnings
"remove[d] the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement,"
enabling Elstad to make a "rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or
invoke his rights." 141 According to the Court, Elstad was "free to exercise his
own volition" in deciding whether to give a confession to authorities, and there
was no reason to believe that his written statement was untrustworthy 142
The Court added that a subsequent warned confession should not be
excluded when police officers make errors in deciding when a person is m
"custody" for purposes of reading the Miranda warnngs. 143 The Court
137 Id. As an example, Justice O'Connor cited Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971), in which the Court permitted a "voluntary" statement taken in violation of Miranda
to be used for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. E/stad, 470 U.S. at 307
138 Id. at 307-09. The Court explained that "a procedural Miranda violation differ[ed]
in significant respects from violations of the fourth amendment, which have traditionally
mandated a broad application of the 'fruits' doctrine." Id. at 306.
139 Id. at 315.
140 Id. at 308, 312. The Court said:
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the
warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to
undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory
process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some
indefinite period. Though Miranda requires that the unwamed admission must be
suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these
circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.
Id. at 309.
141 Id. at 314.
142 Id. at 308, 314-15. Justice O'Connor indicated in a footnote that this case was
unlike the situation where police officers flatly ignored a suspect's invocation of the right to
remain silent or to have counsel present and continued the interrogation. Id. at 312 n.3 (and
cases cited therein).
143 Id. at 309.
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indicated that police officers sometimes will err in making this determination
and fail to give the warnings. 144 In those situations, the Court concluded, the
errors should not "breed the same irremedial consequences" as infringement of
the Fifth Amendment itself. 145 Only when a suspect's statements are actually
coerced should these errors result m suppression of the fruits themselves. 46
Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the Oregon appellate court's view of a
"subtle form of lingering [Fifth Amendment] compulsion." 147 The majority
read the state court's opinion as immunzming a suspect who had made an
unwarned statement from the consequences of his subsequent informed
waiver.148 This immunity, the Court said, came at a "high cost to legitimate
law enforcement activity, while adding little desirable protection to the
individual's interest m not being compelled to testify against humself." 149
Rather than employ a "rigid rule" that the unwarned statement compromised
the voluntarmess of the later confession, the Court indicated, courts should
decide, based on the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police
conduct, whether the second confession was voluntary under the "old" due
process voluntarmess standard.150 "The fact that a suspect [chose] to speak





147 Id. at 309-14. "The Oregon court believed that the unwarned remark
compromised the voluntanness of [Elstad's] later confession, and that only lapse of time
and change of place could dissipate the 'coercive impact' of the inadmissible
statement." Id. at 309-10.
148 Id. at 312.
149 Id. (citation omitted).
150 Id. at 317-18.
151 Id. at 318. The Court concluded that Elstad's.earlier remark was voluntary under
the Fifth Amendment, and that he "knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain
silent" after being read the Miranda warnings. Id. at 314-15. Whatever the reason for the
police oversight in failing to read the Miranda warmngs at the outset, the Court concluded,
"the incident had none of the earmarks of coercion." Id. at 316. "Nor did the officers
exploit the unwarned admission to pressure [Elstadl into waiving his right to remain silent."
Id.
Justice Brennan, together with Justice Marshall, dissented, arguing that, at least with
respect to successive confessions, the majority had stripped remedies for Miranda violations
of the poisonous tree doctrine. Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, I. joins,
dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that a confession obtaineil in violation of an accused's
Miranda rights presumptively tainted a subsequent confession, and that Miranda warnings
alone could not dissipate that taint. Id. at 323.
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Elstad dealt a heavy blow to Miranda. The Court rejected Miranda's core
premise by ruling that a total failure to read the Miranda warnings does not
violate the Fifth Amendment. After Elstad, a defendant cannot rely on the
Miranda presumption of coercion to suppress a subsequent confession under
the poisonous tree doctrine. Instead, he must show that the first unwarned
statement is in fact coerced under the pre-Miranda voluntariness standard.
Failing that, he must make the difficult showing that the second statement
(made after a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights) has been coerced. More
importantly, although Elstad only addressed the adimssibility of a subsequent
warned confession, 152 the case contained language suggesting that the
poisonous tree doctrine was inapplicable when a Miranda violation produced
any evidentiary fruit. 153
B. Miranda Violations and Nontestimonial Fruit
1. Lower Court Decisions
Following Elstad, federal and state courts have almost uniformly ruled that
the prosecution can introduce nontestimonial fruits of a Miranda violation in a
Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing that a Miranda violation was m fact a Fifth
Amendment violation which created a presumption of coercion that attached to subsequent
statements. Id. at 364-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152 The Court's rationale was clearly premised on the fact that the defendant was
challenging a subsequent warned confession. See zd. at 308-09, 314 (relying on the
suspect's "volition" as a significant factor in a case of successive confessions).
153 See, e.g., id. at 307 ("[Tlhe Miranda presumption [of coercion], though
irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief, does not require that the
statements and theirfrtuits be discarded as inherently tainted.") (emphasis added); id. at 308
("We believe that this reasoning [of Michigan v. Tucker] applies with equal force when the
alleged 'fruit' of a noncoercive Miranda violation is neither a witness nor an article of
evidence but the accused's own voluntary testimony.") (emphasis added). But see id. at 319
n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court repeatedly casts its analysis m terms of the 'fruits'
of a Miranda violation, but its dicta nevertheless surely should not be read as
necessarily foreclosing application of denvative-evidence rules where the Miranda violation
produces evidence other than a subsequent confession by the accused.") (citations omitted);
7d. at 347 n.29 ("Notwithstanding the sweep of the Court's language, today's opinion surely
ought not be read as also foreclosing application of the traditional denvative-evidence
presumption to physical evidence obtained as a proximate result of a Miranda violation. The
Court relies heavily on individual 'volition' as an insulating factor in successive-confession
cases."). See also State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 241 (Or. 1989) (noting that although
Elstad stated in dicta that evidence which is the "fruit" of a Miranda violation need not be
suppressed, the "actual holding m Elstad, a successive interrogation case, is
considerably narrower"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986).
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criminal trial.154 The poisonous tree doctrine will be applicable only if there is
evidence of actual coercion or other circumstances designed to overbear the
suspect's will. 155
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Gonzalez-Sandova1 56 is an
example. Gonzalez-Sandoval appeared at a local police station as a condition of
parole and was arrested on the charge of being an illegal alien who had
previously been deported. 157 Agent Mario Vasquez of the United States Border
Patrol transported Gonzalez-Sandoval to the border patrol station for
questioning. 158 The agent also ran a series of record checks to determine the
defendant's immigration status. 159 After the first check revealed that Gonzalez-
Sandoval was an immigrated alien, Agent Vasquez asked Gonzalez-Sandoval if
he had ever used an alias. 160 Agent Vasquez did not read the Miranda
warmngs. 161 Gonzalez-Sandoval answered that he had previously used the
name "Guillen." 162 Agent Vasquez then ran a records check under that name
and discovered the record of Gonzalez-Sandoval's previous deportation. 163 The
defendant was then read his Miranda rights for the first time and charged with
being found illegally in the United States after deportation. 164
154 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1047-48 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Barte, 868 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. dented, 493 U.S.
995 (1989); United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1514-19 (6th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 600-01 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. dented,
488 U.S. 924 (1988); United States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987); In re Owen F., 523 A.2d 627, 631-32 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1987), cert. denied, 528 A.2d 1286 (Md. 1987); People v. Holmes, 536 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291
(1988), appeal dented, 547 N.E.2d 957 (N.Y. 1989); State v. Wethered, 755 P.2d 797,
800-02 (Wash. 1988). But see State v. Gravel, 601 A.2d 678, 682-86 (N.H. 1991) (holding
that defendant's statements obtained in violation of Miranda cannot be relied upon to
establish probable cause for issuance of search warrant; tangible evidence found during
execution of search warrant suppressed); State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 241 (Or. 1985)
(ruling that police officer's failure to read suspect the Miranda warnings and to honor hIs
request for assistance of counsel required suppression of physical evidence denved from
suspect's statements, unless evidence was admissible on an independent ground such as the
inevitable discovery doctrine), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986).
155 Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1048; Barte, 868 F.2d at 774; Sangineto-Miranda,
859 F.2d at 1517; Bengvenga, 845 F.2d at 601; azeny, 794 F.2d at 208; In re Owen F.,
523 A.2d at 631-32; Wethered, 755 P.2d at 801-02.
156 894 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1990).
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The Ninth Circuit ruled that Gonzalez-Sandoval's statements to Agent
Vasquez about his immigration status were obtained in violation of Miranda,165
but that the record of Gonzalez-Sandoval's prior deportation should not be
suppressed as fruit of the unwarned statements. 166 Relying on Elstad and
Tucker, the court of appeals held that the poisonous tree doctrine was
inapplicable when there was no violation of the Fifth Amendment-that is,
when the police merely failed to administer the prophylactic Miranda
warnings. 167 The court found the reasoning of Elstad and Tucker to be
applicable whether the fruit of the Miranda violation was a subsequent
confession or, as in the instant case, nontestimonial evidence.i 6s The critical
inquiry, the court observed, was whether the unwarned statements preceding a
subsequent, warned confession or discovery of nontestimomal evidence were
made voluntarily 169 The court concluded that "[w]here there is no evidence of
coercion or a demal of due process in elicitation of the statements, the object of
the fifth amendment exclusionary rule-assuring trustworthiness of evidence
introduced at trial-is not served by barrmng admission of the derivatively
obtained evidence or statements." 170 The court indicated that there was no
evidence that Agent Vasquez's actions were coercive or that Gonzalez-
Sandoval's unwarned statements were involuntary 171 Because the defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights were not violated, the deportation record was
admissible at trial. 172
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence in New York v Quarles
A year before Justice O'Connor authored Elstad, she argued in New York
v. Quarles173 that nontestimonial fruits of a Miranda violation should be
admissible in evidence. Her concurrence in Quarles is significant because it
provides an alternative rationale for admitting nontestimomal fruits to that
suggested in Elstad and articulated m recent cases like Gonzalez-Sandoval.
In Quarles, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the police had
violated Quarles's rights by failing to read the Miranda warnings before asking
him questions designed to locate his abandoned gun. 174 Justice O'Connor
refused to join the majority in recognmzing a "public safety" exception to
165 Id. at 1046-47







173 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
174Id. at 651.
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Miranda,175 arguing instead that the gun should not have been suppressed
under the poisonous tree doctrine as tainted fruit of the Miranda violation.176
Justice O'Connor relied principally on the Court's ruling m Schmerber v.
Californa,177 which held that state officials did not violate the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by extracting blood from a
suspect and admitting the chemical analysis at trial as proof of intoxication.178
The Schmerber Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment only protected an
accused from being compelled to testify against himself or otherwise provide
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature; it did not prohibit
compulsion that made a suspect the source of real or physical evidence (such as
fingerprints or writing exemplars). 179 The Court noted that the defendant's
testimonial capacities were in no way implicated either in the extraction of the
blood or in the chemical analysis: "Not even a shadow of testimonial
compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused was involved." 180
Had the state tried to show that the accused had incrimnated himself when told
he would have to be tested, the Court added in dicta, the state would have to
forego the testimonial (but not the nontestimonial) products of administering the
test. 1si
Relying on Schmerber and its progeny, Justice O'Connor argued in
Quarles that official compulsion which made a suspect the source of
nontestimonial evidence (such as a gun) did not violate either the Fifth
175 Id. at 661-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting m part). Justice
O'Connor argued that the "public safety" exception blurred the "clear strictures" of
Miranda and made it more difficult to understand. Id. at 660, 663. She noted that "[i]n
some cases, police will benefit because a reviewing court will find that an exigency excused
their failure to read the warmngs. But in other cases, [they] will suffer because, though they
thought an exigency excused their noncompliance, a reviewing court will view the
'objective' circumstances differently and require exclusion [of a suspect's unwarned
admissions]." Id. at 663. The end result, she concluded, would be a "finespun new doctrine
on public safety exigencies incident to custodial interrogation, complete with the hair-
splitting distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at
663-64.
Justice Marshall, together with Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented, arguing that
the majority had abandoned the clear guidelines enunciated in Miranda-"condemn[ing] the
American judiciary to a new era of post hoc inquiry into the propriety of custodial
mterrogations"-and "endorsed the introduction of coerced self-incruimnating statements in
criminal prosecutions." Id. at 674 (Marshall, J., with whom Brennan J., and Stevens, J.,
join, dissenting).
176 Id. at 665-74.
177 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
178 Id. at 761.
179 Id. at 764-65.
is0 Id. at 765.
181 Id. at 765 n.9.
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Amendment or Miranda.182 She recognized that the case was "problematic"
because the police had compelled Quarles "in the Miranda sense" not only to
provide the gun, but also to admit, without the benefit of the Miranda
warnings, where the gun was located and that he owned it. 183 She concluded,
however, that Schmerber was controlling, because the Court had indicated m
dicta that it would permit the admission of nontestimomal evidence even when
the state's compulsion also produced inadmissible testimonial evidence.18 4
Justice O'Connor conceded that the admission of nontestimomal fruits of a
Miranda violation would reduce the incentives to read .the Miranda
warings.185 But that fact, she said, begged the question of how much
enforcement was appropriate. 186 Because the Miranda warnings were only
necessary to ensure that a suspect's "testimony" was voluntary, Justice
O'Connor argued, the failure to administer the warnings should cease to be a
concern once the testimonial products of custodial interrogation are
suppressed.i 8 7 She concluded that the "harm caused by failure to administer
Miranda warings relates only to admission of testimonial self-incriminations,
and the suppression of such incriminations should by itself produce the optimal
enforcement of the Miranda rule."188
182 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 665-72 (1984).
183 Id. at 667.
184 Id. at 667-68. In SchInerber, the Court noted:
This conclusion [that the chemical analysis of the blood was admissible] would not
necessarily govern had the State tried to show that the accused had menrmnated himself
when told that he would have to be tested. Such incriminating evidence may be an
unavoidable by-product of the compulsion to take the test, especially for an individual
who fears the extraction or opposes it on religious grounds. If it wishes to compel
persons to submit to such attempts to discover evidence, the State may have to forgo the
advantage of any testbnonail products of administering the test-products which would
fall within the privilege.
Schrnerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966).
185 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 668.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 668-69.
188 Id. at 669. Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the Court had previously held that
the privilege against self-incrimination required suppression of compelled statements and all
evidence derived therefrom. Id. (citing Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975); Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); McCarthy v. Arndstem, 266 U.S. 34 (1924);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892)). Those cases, she noted, involved persons
appearing before a court or tribunal vested with the contempt power. Id. The witnesses in
those situations were subject to "'the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or
contempt.'" Id. (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)). The
tribunal thus could require a witness to appear and testify even if he had formally and
expressly asserted a privilege of silence. Id. "If the witness' invocation of the privilege at [a
19921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Justice O'Connor concluded by looking to the experience of countries like
England, Scotland and India to determine whether the gun should be
suppressed. 189 She noted that the learning of other countries was important to
development of the initial Miranda rule. 190 She found that "nontestimonial
evidence derived from confessions 'not blatantly coerced' was and still is
admitted." 191 Admission of such evidence, she noted, was based on the "very
sensible view that procedural errors should not cause entire investigations and
prosecutions to be lost." 192
DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court has communicated the wrong message to federal and
state courts confronting Miranda violations: The poisonous tree doctrine is not
subsequent criminal] trial [was] not to be defeated by the State's refusal to let him remain
silent at an earlier proceeding, the witness [had] to be protected 'against the use of hIs
compelled answers and any evidence derived therefrom.'" Id. at 669-70 (quoting Lefkowitz
v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973)).
Justice O'Connor argued, by contrast, that a suspect subject to custodial interrogation
was not m the same position. Id. at 670. She noted that when a suspect merely interjects a
"post hoc complaint that the police failed to adminster [the] Miranda warmngs, he invokes
only an irrebuttable presumption that the interrogation was coercive. He does not show that
the privilege was raised and that the police actually or overtly coerced him to provide
testimony and other evidence to be used against him at trial." Id. The suspect "could have
remained silent and the interrogator could not have pumshed him for refusing to speak." Id.
Thus, she argued that the interrogation did not subject the accused to this cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt, and he had a "much less sympathetic case for
obtaining the benefit of a broad suppression ruling." Id.
Justice O'Connor was willing to recogmze a "broader exclusionary rule" covering
evidentiary fruits when a suspect was "subject to abusive police practices and actually or
overtly compelled to speak." Id. at 672. In that situation, she believed it was reasonable to
infer "both an unwillingness to speak and a perceptible assertion of the privilege [against
self-incrimination]." Id.
189 Id. at 672-73.
190 Id. at 673.
191 Id. (citing HENRY 3. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 282 (1967); Commissioners of
Customs & Excise v. Harz, 1 All E.R. 177, 182 (1967); The King v. Warickshall, 168
Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783)).
192 Id. (citation omitted). Justice Marshall rejected Justice O'Connor's approach,
arguing that her concuring opimon "represent[ed] a much more radical departure from
precedent" than it acknowledged. Id. at 688 n. 11 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued that
the gun should have been suppressed as "the direct product of a coercive custodial
interrogation." Id. at 688. He concluded, however, that the proper disposition was to let the
New York Court of Appeals decide the issue, because the poisonous tree doctrine had
changed since the lower court's ruling. Id. at 689-90 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
(1984) (recognizing inevitable discovery exception to poisonous tree doctrine)).
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applicable to such police misconduct. In so doing, the Court has demgrated the
import of Miranda, lost sight of the underlying rationale of the poisonous tree
doctrine, and overlooked its own precedents requiring suppression of
nontestimomal fruits. Cases like Elstad -and Tucker, by minimizing the
seriousness of the police nusconduct producing the evidentiary fruits, breed
contempt for the law and encourage the same conduct that Miranda was
designed to prevent.
The Court should send a very different message: The poisonous tree
doctrine must be applied to Miranda violations. The opening example is just
such a situation. 193 The police interrogated Jones m custody without reading
the Miranda warnings and used his confession to discover the gun. The gun
has been "'come at by exploitation of [the] illegality '"194 Thus, the gun should
be suppressed as tainted fruit of the Miranda violation, unless the prosecution
can show that one of the exceptions to the poisonous tree doctrine is
applicable.195
I. NONTESTIMONIAL FRUIT AS TAINTED EVIDENCE
Although the Supreme Court has abandoned Miranda's core premise196-
that a Miranda violation is a Fifth Amendment violation 197-suppression of
193 See supra p.807.
194 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (citation omitted).
195 The Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the poisonous tree
doctrine. See supra note 19.
196 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of the Crnnal Process
and the 7hree Phases of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS-RIGHTS AND WRONGS
IN THE SUPREME COURT, 1969-1986, 140, 150-57 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987).
197 The Court in Elstad undermined Miranda's core premise in a few words. After
characterizing the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic" and "not protected by the
Constitution," the Court reasoned that the failure to administer these warnings was not a
violation of the Fifth Amendment. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305-06 & n.1 (1985).
The Court made a similar observation a year earlier in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654 (1984). Both Elstad and Quarles relied on Tucker to reach this conclusion.
The Court's reasoning is faulty in several critical respects. First, and foremost, Tucker
does not support the Court's conclusion in Elstad. It is one tung to say, as in Tucker, that
the failure to read only one of the warnings (the right to have counsel appointed if indigent)
is not a Fifth Amendment violation, particularly when the interrogation occurred before
Miranda was decided. It is quite another thing to say, as the Court did in Elstad and
Quarles, that the failure to read all the warnings should have the same result. Whatever
compulsion was inherent in the custodial situation in which Tucker found himself was no
doubt dissipated by the police officer's warnings that he had the right to remain silent and to
request an attorney (both of which he refused to exercise). The same cannot be said when
the police fail to read any of the warnings.
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To be sure, the Miranda warnings are not "protected" by the Constitution m the sense
that no substitutes will be recognized. As the majority m Miranda indicated, the Constitution
does not require adherence to a particular litany as a prerequisite to informing a suspect of
hIs rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). However, the Miranda Court
made clear that, unless other procedures were shown to be as effective, a total failure to
provide any of the warnings zs a Fifth Amendment violation. Id., see also Stone, supra note
64, at 119. Indeed, the Court expressly adopted the lugh standard of proof for the waiver of
constitutional rights first enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), as the
standard for waiver of Miranda rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. The Court reaffirmed
that a Miranda violation was of constitutional magnitude three years later m Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969) ("[T]he use of [any] admissions obtained in the absence of
the required [Miranda] warnings [is] a flat violation of the Self-Incrimnation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment ").
The Elstad Court's contrary conclusion reflects a fundamental retreat from Miranda.
The Court m Miranda indicated in clear and unnustakable language that the warnings were
necessary to combat the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation and to
ensure an informed and voluntary relinquishment of rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
Without being "adequately and effectively apprised" of his rights, the Court ruled, the
suspect is subject to compulsion in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
Moreover, the Elstad Court's view of the Miranda warnings as nonconstitutional
safeguards cannot be squared with its ruling that statements taken in violation of Miranda
are "irrebuttabl[y]" presumed to be coerced. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307 The Court's
schizophrenic characterization of such unwarned statements as at once "coerced" and
"voluntary" is illogical and can only breed confusion. Id. at 352 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
The Court cannot have it both ways. If unwarned statements are "irrebuttabl[y]" presumed
to be coerced, they should be excluded (along with their fruits) under the Fifth Amendment.
If, on the other hand, the statements are voluntary, there is no basis for excluding them
under the Constitution in the first place.
As it now stands, the Court is requiring suppression of statements that it believes are
not compelled under the Fifth Amendment. While the Court may have the supervisory
authority to require that result in federal courts, it has no such authority-m the absence of a
constitutional basis-to require suppression in state courts. As Justice Stevens observed in
his Elstad dissent:
This Court's power to require state courts to exclude probative self-incriminatory
statements rests entirely on the premise that the use of such evidence violates the
Federal Constitution. The same constitutional analysis applies whether the custodial
interrogation is actually coercive or irrebuttably presumed to be coercive. If the Court
does not accept that premise, it must regard the holding in the Miranda case itself, as
well as all of the federal jurisprudence that has evolved from that decision, as nothing
more than an illegitimate exercise of raw judicial power.
Id. at 370-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted); see also Sonenshem, supra note
116, at 426-27; Stone, supra note 64, at 119-20.
The correct approach is as Miranda originally intended. Unwarned statements elicited
through custodial interrogation cannot be "voluntary"; they are coerced and must be
suppressed under the Fifth Amendment. Once it is recognized that the failure to administer
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nontestimonial fruits remains necessary for the following compelling reasons:
to deter the police from failing to read the Miranda warnings; to restore the
status quo prevailing before the Miranda violation; to provide the police with
clear guidelines about permissible interrogation tactics; and to prevent the
incorporation of the unworkable, pre-Miranda voluntariness standard into the
derivative evidence analysis.
A. Deterrence of Police Misconduct
When the police seek to obtain a confession from a suspect in custody, they
must decide whether to read the Miranda warnings before the interrogation
begins. They will be presented with two options. They can either: (1) forego
the warnings and any confession the suspect makes; or (2) read the warnings
and risk having the suspect exercise his right to remain silent. The certainty
that the suspect's confession will be suppressed if the Miranda warnings are
not read serves as a strong deterrent against committing a Miranda violation
and encourages police officers to choose the second option.
The police have different incentives when they know that nontestimomal
fruits of a Miranda violation will be admissible at trial. Again, their choices
will be twofold: (1) forego the warnings and the suspect's confession, but with
the understanding that the confession can be used to discover admissible
nontestimonial evidence; or (2) read the warnings and risk losing both the
confession and the resultant nontestimonial evidence if the suspect exercises his
right to remain silent. Given the potential benefits of the first option, the police
will have a significant incentive to ignore the Miranda wamings.198 The
the Miranda warnings constitutes a Fifth Amendment violation, it follows that
nontestimomal fruits must be suppressed as well. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
488 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939).
198 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J., joins,
dissenting) ("If the police through illegal interrogation could discover contraband and be
confident that the contraband 'ordinarily' would not be suppressed, what possible incentive
would [the police] have to obey Miranda?"); United States v Downing, 665 F.2d 404, 409
n.5 (1st Cir. 1981) ("The possibility of obtaining admissible derivative evidence would seem
to remove much of the incentive for police to follow the dictates of Miranda."); People v.
Schader, 457 P.2d 841, 852 (Cal. 1969) ("The exclusionary rule is applied to the [physical]
fruits as well as the words of an illegally obtained confession. A contrary rule would
undermine the rights to counsel and to remain silent by providing police the simple
expedient of conducting illegal interrogations for the purpose of obtaining physical evidence
of guilt while foregoing the use at trial of the statements of the accused."); State v. Preston,
411 A.2d 402, 408 (Me. 1980) ("The deterrent effect on police misconduct of excluding
admissions obtained as [the defendant's (i.e., without Miranda warnings)], would be
substantially reduced if real evidence delivered to the police as part of the suspect's direct
response to the unwarned custodial interrogation were permitted in evidence."); State v.
Gravel, 601 A.2d 678, 685 (N.H. 1991) ("To allow the police the freedom to disregard the
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deterrent effect of suppressing the suspect's confession is significantly reduced
by the opportunity to uncover highly probative, admissible evidence.' 99 As one
commentator has observed:
[I]t is clear that if the police were permitted to utilize illegally obtained
confessions for links and leads rather than being required to gather evidence
independently, then the Miranda warnings would be of no value m protecting
the privilege against self-mcriination. The requirement of a warning would
be meaningless, for the police would be permitted to accomplish indirectly
what they could not accomplish directly, and there would exist no incentive to
warn.
200
requirements of Miranda and thereby risk losing only the direct product of such action, but
not the evidence derived from it, would not only not deter future Miranda violations but
might well tend to encourage them."); Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v.
New York. Some Anxous Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon
Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1219 (1971) ("There is no reason to expect an exclusionary
rule to deter deliberate violations unless it has eliminated all significant incentives toward
that conduct.").
199 The fear that the Miranda warnings will inhibit self-incriminating statements makes
the first option even more attractive than the second. See, e.g., Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d
1220, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane) (police officer testified that the suspect
purposefully was not advised of his Miranda rights to ensure that he would not rely on his
right to remain silent); Yarber v. State, 375 So. 2d 1212, 1215 (Ala. Cnm. App. 1977)
(police officer testified that the defendant purposely was not advised of his Miranda rights
"for the sole reason that the officers thought that if he was advised of his rights he would not
testify"), rev'd on other grounds, Ex parte Yarber, 375 So. 2d 1229 (Ala. 1978); H.
RICHARD UvILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL, A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR ON THE
STREETs wrrH THE NEw YORK CrrY PoLICE 206 (1988) ("[A] number of experienced line
officers believed that the Miranda warnings actually do inhibit self-incriminating
revelations.").
200 Pitler, supra note 65, at 620 (footnotes omitted). Professor Kamisar has made a
similar observation:
What is the point of formulating comprehensive rules as the Court did in Miranda if the
police still have a substantial incentive to continue to disregard these rules, if the police
can still make use of all the leads and clues stemming from the inadmissible statements
or confessions? You are not going to influence police practices greatly, you are not
likely to get the police to change their procedures, if you permit them to operate on the
premise that even if they pay no attention to Miranda they can still obtain and introduce
in a trial valuable evidence derived from the suspect's statements.
If Miranda is to make any sense, if Miranda is to be taken seriously, if Miranda is to be
afforded a real chance of deterring objectionable and impermissible police interrogation
practices, then the stolen property and the murder weapon and other physical evidence
obtained as a result of these madmissible statements must be thrown out.
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Indeed, there are many reported cases where the police have arrested
suspects and interrogated them without the Miranda warnings in order to
discover the existence or location of nontestimomal evidence.20 1 This should
not come as a surprise to those knowledgeable about police practices. Expert
interrogators have long recognized, and continue to instruct, that a confession
is a primary source for determining the existence and whereabouts of the fruits
of a crime, such as documents or weapons. 202 "The process of interrogation
NEW LOOK AT CONFESSIONS, supra note 94, at 150; see also Kamisar, supra note 196, at
156 ("How can we expect the police to comply with Miranda when we prohibit only the
confessions obtained in violation of that doctrine, but permit the use of everything these
confessions bring to light?"); Howard R. Shapiro, Note, Miranda Without Warning:
Derivative Evidence as Forbidden Fruit, 41 BROOK. L. REV 325, 343-44 (1974) ("The
inadmissibility of the statements themselves would hardly offset the potential benefits [of
evidence obtained by Miranda violations], and there would exist no real incentive to comply
with Miranda."); Coinfession, supra note 39, at 1029 ("Insofar as confessions are excluded
in order to deter police violation of other rights of a suspect, the indications that police seek
to elicit confessions to obtain leads to other evidence as well as to obtain the confessions
themselves argue in favor of excluding the products as well.") (footnotes omitted).
201 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that
police officers "persistently interrogated [suspect] for nearly an hour," failed to read
Miranda warnings, induced him to reveal the contents of his wallet, and then confronted
him with the information that it contained bait money); United States v. Sangmeto-Miranda,
859 F.2d 1501, 1515 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding facts in which police officers arrested and
handcuffed suspects, failed to read Miranda warnings, and interrogated one of them about
means of transportation to place of arrest); United States v. Rullo, 748 F Supp. 36, 39 (D.
Mass. 1990) (finding that police officers punched and kicked suspect in custody, failed to
read Miranda warnings, and repeatedly interrogated him about location of gun); State v.
Wethered, 755 P.2d 797, 798 (Wash. 1988) (finding that police officer arrested suspect,
failed to read Miranda warnings, and interrogated him about location of hashish); UVILLER,
supra note 199, at 205 (recounting several police officers' admissions that when they fail to
read the Miranda warnings, they are seeking "confirmation of suspicion or leads to
accomplices or weapons").
202 O'HARA & O'HARA, supra note 25, at 119 (stating that purpose of interrogation is
to "learn of the existence and locations of physical evidence such as documents or
weapons"); AUBRY & CAPUTO, supra note 25, at 27-28 (explaining that interrogation is
"valuable in developing information leading to the recovery of the fruits of the crime");
WAYNE W BENNETT & KAREN M. HESS, CRImINAL INVESTIGATION 182 (1987) (stating
that "questioning can provide leads for finding physical evidence"); ART BUCKWALTER,
INTERVIEWS & INTERROGATIONS 189 (1983) (explaining that objective of interrogation is
to "recover stolen goods or other fruits of a crime"); see also UVILLER, supra note 199, at
184 (recounting a sergeant's "heavy-handed interrogation [which] might well have been
excessive, but [whose] only purpose seem[ed] to have been the recovery of the weapon");
STEPHENS, supra note 35, at 192 (1973) (survey-research findings).
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ideally lends itself to the accomplishment of the recovery of the fruits of a
crime, particularly m the areas of stolen property, contraband, and money "203
Suppression of a suspect's unwarned statements alone will not provide
sufficient deterrence of police misconduct. Police officers seeking physical
evidence are not likely to view the loss of an unwarned confession as
particularly great when weighed against the opportunity to recover highly
probative nontestimonial evidence, such as a murder weapon or narcotics. 2°4
Recovery of such evidence might well convince a suspect to forego a trial and
plead guilty, thereby preventing the Miranda issue from ever being raised.
Because most criminal cases are resolved on the basis of guilty pleas, the loss
of the unwarned confession may have little practical (or deterrent) effect.
At trial, physical evidence is likely to have a greater impact on the ultimate
determination of guilt or innocence than a confession. Confessions tend to be
viewed with skepticism and even mistrust, particularly when they are recounted
by police officers or subsequently challenged by the defendant. 205 On the other
hand, nontestimonial evidence typically is "the most important element" in a
case, establishing, for instance, the corpus delicti.206 It Is "mute proof of fact
that hardly need[s] the same degree of corroboration as an outright confession,
let alone a statement subject to contradiction." 20 7 Such evidence particularly
carries a great deal of weight at trial when it is introduced through the
203 AUBRY & CAPUTO, supra note 25, at 28. See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S.
324, 325 (1969) (finding that police interrogated suspect to locate pistol); United States v.
Barte, 868 F.2d 773, 773-74 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that postal inspectors interrogated
letter carrer to locate letter containing transmitter), cert. dented, 493 U.S. 995 (1989);
People v. Saiz, 620 P.2d 15, 17 (Colo. 1980) (finding that police interrogated suspect to
locate victim's wallet); Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 85 (Wyo. 1983) (finding that police
interrogated suspect to locate victim's boots); see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 103 (1964) (White, J., concurrng) (stating that a coerced confession "is as revealing of
leads as testimony given in exchange for immunity").
204 State v. Gravel, 601 A.2d 678, 685 (N.H. 1991) ("An officer more concerned with
the physical fruits of an unlawfully obtained confession than with the confession itself rmght
reasonably decide that the benefits of securing admissible derivative evidence outweighed
the loss of the statements. Miranda would thus have lost a substantial amount of its value m
protecting against compelled self-incrimination.").
205 UVILLER, supra note 199, at 185; O'HARA & O'HARA, supra note 25, at 141. A
conviction cannot be based solely on an uncorroborated confession of guilt; the confession
requires extrinsic corroboration. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1963);
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1954); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84,
89-91 (1954).
206 AUBRY & CAPUTO, supra note 25, at 28.
207 LEONARD L. LEVY, CONSTrITrUTIONAL OPINIONS: ASPECTS OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 217 (1986).
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testimony of an expert witness. Indeed, many criminal prosecutions would fail
without nontestimomal evidence.20 8
Whatever deterrent effect results from suppressing an unwamed confession
is virtually eliminated when, under Elstad, the police can "recover" the lost
confession (after discovering nontestimomal evidence) by simply reading the
suspect the Miranda warnings and continuing the interrogation. 20 9 By
requesting an encore performance from a suspect who has already incriminated
himself once, the police are likely to elicit the same confession as they had
before, 210 only this time the suspect's statements will be admissible at trial.211
The probability that the suspect will confess a second time will be even greater
if the police confront the suspect with the nontestimonial evidence.2 12 Hence,
there appears to be little reason for the police to read a suspect the Miranda
warnings before initiating the interrogation when they will be rewarded by their
failure to do so-by discovering nontestimonial evidence and, after a belated
reading of the warnings, by eliciting an admissible confession.
In short, police officers will come away with the wrong message: It is
better to interrogate a suspect without the Miranda warnings than to use
legitimate means to investigate crime.213 Permitting such interrogation would
send an ominous signal to the police and prosecutors that citizens may be
"exploited for the information necessary to condemn them before the law "214
208 Id. ("The trustworthiness of physical evidence is such that without it a case may not
be supported."); BENNET & HESS, supra note 202, at 182 (explaining that a confession
"cannot legally stand alone," but "must be supported by physical evidence or other
corroboration"); JAMES GILBERT, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 117 (2d ed. 1986) (stating
that "few criminal prosecutions will be successful without additional evidence"); see Walder
v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 62-63 (1954) (government dismissed its 1950 heroin
prosecution against defendant when the narcotics were suppressed as illegally seized).
209 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985).
2 10 See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 n.12 (1975); Darwin v. Connecticut, 391
U.S. 346, 350-51 (1968); United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1946); see also
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 325-32, 356-57 (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, I., joins,
dissenting); Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition
of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV 69, 95 (1989).
211 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
212 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding
police officers persistently interrogated suspect for nearly an hour, failed to read Miranda
warnings, induced him to reveal the contents of his wallet, and then confronted him with the
information that it contained bait money).
213 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963) ("[Hlistory amply shows that
confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials the trouble and effort
of obtaining valid and independent evidence ").
214 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., announcing
the judgment of the Court).
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On the other hand, the police would be significantly deterred from
committing Miranda violations if the poisonous tree doctrine were applicable to
nontestimomal fruits. 215 They would know that their failure to read the
Miranda warnings would result in the suppression of both the suspect's
confession and any nontestimomal evidence that is discovered. 216 The police
would thus have every incentive to comply with Miranda.217
215 The poisonous tree doctrine's effectiveness m deterring future police misconduct m
the opening example distinguishes that situation from Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974). In Tucker, the exclusionary rule's deterrence rationale was not served by
suppressing the fruits of the defendant's statement because the police had fully complied
with the constitutional principles applicable at the time of the interrogation (which antedated
Miranda). As Justice Brennan noted in his Elstad dissent, "Because the questioning in
Tucker occurred before Miranda was announced and was otherwise conducted m an
objectively reasonable manner, the exclusion of the derivative evidence solely for failure to
comply with the then-nonexistent Miranda requirement would not significantly deter future
Miranda violations." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 355-56 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In the opening example, by contrast, the police have no excuse for failing to
comply with the Miranda requirements, and thus suppression of Jones's pistol would deter
this misconduct m the future. Several courts have distinguished Tucker on this basis. See,
e.g., United States v. Dowing, 665 F.2d 404, 407 (1st Cir. 1981); In re Appeal No. 245
(75) from Circuit Court for Kent County, 349 A.2d 434, 445 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
216 Studies indicate that the exclusionary rule in the Fourth Amendment context has a
deterrent effect on unlawful police behavior. See, e.g., Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REV 24 (1980); Myron W
Orfield, Jr., Note, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empincal Study of Chicago
Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV 1016 (1987). "When evidence is suppressed, the
police officers learn about the law of search and seizure and apply these lessons to bring
their search into line with the requirement of the fourth amendment." Orfield, supra, at
1039. Based on these studies, it is reasonable to assume that the same conclusion would
apply in the Fifth Amendment context. See Stone, supra note 64, at 113 n.71 ("Miranda is
likely to have a significant deterrent impact because 'the predominant incentive for
interrogation is to obtain evidence for use in court. Consequently, police conduct in this
area is likely to be responsive to judicial rules governing the admissibility of that
evidence.'" (quoting Dallin H. Oaks, Studyng the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. Cm. L. REv 665, 722 (1970)).
217 The prosecution has no legitimate claim to evidentiary fruits that the police have
acquired through misconduct. As Justice Stewart has observed:
The exclusion of an illegally procured confession and any [evidentiary fruits] obtained
m its wake deprives the Government of nothing to which it has any lawful claim and
creates no impediment to legitimate methods of investigating and prosecuting crime. On
the contrary, the exclusion of evidence causally linked to the Government's illegal
activity no more than restores the situation that would have prevailed if the Government
had itself obeyed the law.
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B. Trustworthness of Nontestimonial Evidence
The Supreme Court's refusal in Elstad to apply the poisonous tree doctrine
to Miranda violations appears to have been motivated by a concern for
excluding relevant and trustworthy evidence from a defendant's trial. 218 There
can be little doubt that the poisonous tree doctrine occasionally will exact a
high cost by allowing a guilty person to go free.219 The existence of a
countervailing governmental interest, however, does not resolve the issue.
Although the government has a legitimate interest in making probative
evidence available at trial, the Supreme Court long ago struck the balance in
favor of society's need to deter illegal police conduct. Ever since Weeks v.
United States,220 the Court has accepted the notion that the only effective way
to deter police misconduct is to exclude tainted evidence, even when the
evidence is highly probative of guilt. 221 Over 30 years ago, Justice Frankfurter,
Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224 n.10 (1968). Thus, the poisonous tree
doctrine restores the status quo prevailing before the Miranda violation and ensures that the
government is not "in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had
transpired." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). At the same time, the prosecuting
authorities are precluded from making the courts an accomplice to the admission of tainted
evidence. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1959) (stating that exclusion
of evidence seized m violation of the Fourth Amendment is required by the "imperative of
judicial integrity"); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943) ("[A] conviction
resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which
Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves
accomplices m wilful disobedience of law.").
218 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985).
219 See James v. llinois, 493 U.S. 307, 319 (1990) ("The cost to the truth-seeking
process of evidentiary exclusion invariably is perceived more tangibly in discrete
prosecutions than is the protection of privacy values through deterrence of future police
nusconduct.").
220 232 U.S. 383 (1914). As Professor Kamisar reminds us, the exclusionary rule was
not an "innovation" of the Warren Court, but a rule established by the White Court in
Weeks and reaffirmed by the Taft, Hughes, Stone and Vinson Courts. Karmsar, supra note
58, at 539 n.14.
221 See James, 493 U.S. at 311 ("The occasional suppression of illegally obtained yet
probative evidence has long been considered a necessary cost of preserving overriding
constitutional values: 'Inhere is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution
sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.'")
(citation omitted); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984) ("The core rationale
consistently advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is
the fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly
course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory
protections."); see also Brown v. Ilinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-01 (1975); Weeks, 232 U.S.
at 391-93.
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writing for the Court in Rogers v. Richmond,222 made this clear m a confession
case, concluding that a coerced confession must be excluded at trial even
though "independent corroborating evidence" left little doubt about its truth.223
The tainted evidence must be excluded essentially to teach the police an
important and costly lesson: Failure to respect a suspect's rights will have
adverse consequences and should not be repeated. 224
Indeed, the poisonous tree doctrine is an effective deterrent precisely
because it requires suppression of highly relevant and trustworthy evidence.
The police are more apt to obey the law and honor a suspect's rights when they
know that, if they commit rmsconduct, evidence highly probative of guilt will
be madmissible at trial. If the evidence were inconsequential, the police would
not likely be too concerned about the consequences of their conduct.
Just as the prosecution cannot argue that a coerced confession should be
admissible on the ground that other evidence demonstrates its truthfulness, 225
the prosecution must also be precluded from arguing that nontestimomal fruits
of a Miranda violation are trustworthy and thus admissible at trial. In both
situations, a compelling need exists to suppress the tainted evidence in order to
instill in the offending officers and in their future counterparts the importance
of observing a suspect's rights.226
222 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
223 Id. at 541; see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
224 The purpose of the poisonous tree doctrine, like the exclusionary rule itself, is to
deter-to compel respect for the accused's rights "in the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963), the Court excluded a
confession that the police obtained after an unconstitutional entry of the defendant's living
quarters and his unlawful arrest, as well as the narcotics discovered as a result of the
confession. The Court concluded that suppression of the "physical" and "verbal" fruits was
necessary to deter lawless police conduct-regardless of the probativity of the narcotics-
and to "clos[e] the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally
obtained." Id. at 484-86.
225 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 n.23 (1974); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368, 384-85 (1964); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540-41.
226 Even those who believe that the poisonous tree doctrine should not apply to
Miranda violations concede that nontestimomal fruits of a "coerced" confession should be
suppressed, regardless of the reliability of those fruits. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 672 (1984) (O'Connor, I., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Tucker, 417 U.S. at
461 (White, J., concurring); FRIENDLY, supra note 94, at 282; Brief for United States as
Amicus Cunae Supporting Petitioner, at 26-27, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)
(No. 82-1213); Brief for the United States as Amcus Curiae, at 44 n.29, Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (No. 73-482). Many courts have so held. See, e.g., United
States v. Rullo, 748 F Supp. 36, 43-45 (D. Mass. 1990); People v. Robinson, 210 N.W.2d
372, 376 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Jensen, 349 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 349-50 (Vt. 1982). Yet, the nontestimomal fruits of
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Despite the Supreme Court's concern in Elstad that exclusion of
nontestimnomal fruits will have a negative impact on law enforcement, a broad
application of the poisonous tree doctrine is not likely to handicap the
investigation and prosecution of crime. The police have a variety of methods at
their disposal to search for the fruits of a crime. For Instance, they can question
persons who are not in custody or otherwise deprived of their freedom in a
significant way without reading the Miranda warnings, 227 and they may
dispense with the warnings when public safety concerns are involved.228 The
police are allowed to use a suspect's volunteered statements as a means of
discovering evidentiary fruits.229 They can also pose as inmates in a jail and
a coerced confession are no less reliable than those of a confession m violation of Miranda.
As Justice Herbert B. Cohen of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has remarked:
If by the exercise of brute force and physical coercion, law enforcement officers obtain
a confession which leads them to other incriminating evidence and there is no
independent source of that evidence available to the officers and no attenuation, there is
little doubt that both the confession and the derivative evidence are inadmissible. This is
so even though the derivative evidence corroborates the confession and is reliable.
Reliability is no longer the test of the admissibility of confessions and derivative
evidence.
Under Miranda the interest protected-the psychological security of the accused-
is in legal theory no different from the interest protected by the earlier cases, the
physical security of the defendant. In either case the purpose of the exclusionary rule is
to prevent police intimidation of a criminal suspect and to guarantee that a confession
given while a person is in custody will be a free and voluntary product of the exercise
of the confessor's will and that derivative evidence obtained therefrom will not suffer
the tant of a police intrusion upon the will of the accused. Accordingly, logic and good
sense dictate that the same rule governing admissibility of derivative evidence be
applied in a case involving a confession obtained by psychological overbearing as is
applied to a confession obtained by physical coercion. The result is identical-the
information gleaned is tainted evidence. The applicable rule of admissibility should be
identical, too.
NEW LOOK AT CONFESSIONS, supra note 94, at 142.
227 California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per cunam); see, e.g., United
States v. Gale, 952 F.2d 1412, 1414-17 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that suspect's remarks
about possession of drugs and the drugs themselves were admissible when he was not mn
custody at time of police interrogation), cert. dented, 112 S. Ct. 1302 (1992).
228 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-56; see, e.g., Fleming v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1109, 1112-
14 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane) (holding that police interrogation without Miranda warnings
about location of gun permissible under "public safety" exception).
229 See, e.g., United States v. Valencia, 558 F Supp. 1270, 1274-75 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (ruling that drugs discovered as a result of suspect's voluntary statements to police are
admissible), at'd, 742 F.2d 1443 (2d Cir. 1984); State v. Golman, 536 So. 2d 481, 490
(La. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that gun discovered as a result of volunteered confession,
following valid waiver of Miranda rights, admissible), cert. dented, 493 U.S. 832 (1989);
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question other inmates about the fruits of a crime without reading the Miranda
warnngs.23 0
Even when the police fail to read the Miranda warnings to a person in
custody, the prosecution can introduce derivative evidence if the evidence was
in fact discovered independent of the misconduct23 1 or would have been
inevitably discovered through lawful means already being pursued when the
illegality occurred. 23 2 Derivative evidence will also be admissible if the
connection between the illegal conduct and the acquisition of the evidence was
so attenuated that the taint of the unlawful acts was dissipated. 23 3
C. Whither Went Nardone?
The Supreme Court in Elstad refused to apply the poisonous tree doctrine
to Miranda violations because the police did not violate a constitutional
right.234 However, the objective of the poisonous tree doctrine-effective
deterrence of police misconduct-is equally applicable when the offending
conduct fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation as when it does. In
both situations, the offending officers and their counterparts will be effectively
deterred from committing future misconduct only if the derivative evidence is
suppressed. 235
see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (holding that volunteered statements of
any kind are a proper element of law enforcement and are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment).
230 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990).
231 Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537-39 (1988); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
232 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); see, e.g., United States v. Lee, 699
F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that defendant's shoes discovered as a result of his
confession in violation of Miranda were admissible under inevitable discovery doctrine);
State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 242-44 (Or. 1985) (stating that deceased victim's body
discovered as a result of defendant's statements in violation of Miranda was admssible
under inevitable discovery doctrine), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986).
233 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
234 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1985).
235 Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43. When the police fail to honor a suspect's request to
remain silent or for assistance of counsel-unlike the situation where the police only fail to
read the Miranda warnings in the first place-a constitutional violation has occurred.
Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 293 (1986); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 52
(1985); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-86 (1981); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707, 719 (1979). Even under the Elstad Court's view of Miranda, nontestimomal fruit must
be suppressed in order to deter future constitutional violations. See, e.g., United States v.
Downing, 665 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1981); People v. Winsett, 583 N.E.2d 589, 595-96
(11. App. Ct. 1991); State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 241 (Or. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1141 (1986); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1116 & n.27 (Ut. App. 1991) (on
rehearing), cert. dented, 817 P.2d 327 (Jt. 1991); see Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312 n.3
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Ironically, the Supreme Court applied the poisonous tree doctrine to a
nonconstitutional violation in the seminal case on the doctrine itself, Nardone v.
United States.23 6 The Court ruled that the government's violation of the federal
wiretapping statute implicated the poisonous tree doctrine.237 As a result, the
government was precluded from using illegal wiretap messages not only as
direct proof of guilt, but also as a basis to build a case against the defendant on
retrial. 23 8 Permitting the accused "to examine the prosecution as to the uses to
which it had put the information," 239 the Court said, "[tio forbid the direct use
of [illegally obtained evidence] but to put no curb on their full indirect use
would only mvite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical standards
and destructive of personal liberty '"240 The Court's ruling in Nardone shows
that the poisonous tree doctrine is concerned with the lawlessness of official
conduct, not with its constitutional significance.
Nardone is not an aberration. The Court again applied the poisonous tree
doctrine to a nonconstitutional violation in Hamson v. United States.241 The
Court ruled that when the prosecution introduces a defendant's confession at
trial in violation of Mallory v. United States,242 and the defendant is compelled
to testify in rebuttal, the testimony is the fruit of the inadmissible confession
and cannot be used on retrial. 243 The Mallory exclusionary rule, which requires
suppression of a confession obtained during an unnecessary delay in bringing a
suspect before a judicial officer after arrest, is based on Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 5(a) and the Court's supervisory powers over the
administration of criminal justice in federal courts. Like Nardone, Harrison
(suggesting that poisonous tree doctrine would apply to cases in which the police ignored a
suspect's invocation of right to remain silent or to have counsel present and subjected hun to
continued interrogation). The same rule should be applicable when the police interrogate a
suspect without obtaining a valid waiver of Miranda rights. See, e.g., In re Appeal No. 245
(75) from Circuit Court for Kent County, 349 A.2d 434, 444-47 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1975).
236 308 U.S. 338 (1939). It is telling that the Elstad Court never mentions Nardone.
Instead, the Court asserts that the figure of speech-"fruit of the poisonous tree"-is drawn
from Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305.
237 Nardone, 308 U.S. at 340-41.
238 Id. at 341.
239 Id. at 339.
240 Id. at 340.
241 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
242 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
243 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968). The Hamson Court found
that the defendant testified "to overcome the impact of confessions illegally obtained and
hence improperly introduced" and thus the testimony was "tainted by the same illegality that
rendered the confessions themselves madmissible." Id. at 223.
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demonstrates that the rationale of the poisonous tree doctrine fully applies to
police misconduct that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 244
Once the underlying premise of the poisonous tree doctrine is accepted, no
logical basis exists for refusing to apply the doctrine to Miranda violations.
Indeed, if Congress had required the police to read the Miranda warnings,
rather than the Supreme Court itself, Nardone and Hamson would be
controlling and mandate exclusion of derivative evidence.245 The fact that the
warnings are instead "judicially-created protections" 246 should not change that
result, unless the Court is willing to acknowledge, at great expense to its own
prestige and constitutional standing, that its own rules demand less respect than
corresponding statutory rules.
24 4 In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316-17 (1985), the majority cites Harnson for
the following proposition: "If the prosecution has actually violated the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights by introducing an inadmissible confession at trial, compelling the
defendant to testify in rebuttal," the prosecution is prohibited from using that testimony on
retrial. The Elstad majority fails to recognize, however, that Harrson did not involve a
Fifth Amendment violation.
245 Congress has, in fact, legislated the Miranda warnings and a derivative evidence
rule for the military. See infra notes 306-19 and accompanying text.
The American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure recommends
that the fruits of statements obtained without adequate warnings should be suppressed:
If a statement is obtained in such a manner that it would be subject to suppression
pursuant to Sections 150.2 and 150.3, and if as a result of such statement other
evidence is discovered subsequently and offered against the defendant, such evidence
shall be subject to suppression unless the prosecution establishes that such evidence
would probably have been discovered by law enforcement authorities irrespective of
such statement and the court finds that exclusion of such evidence is not necessary to
deter violations of this Code.
A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.4 at 70-71 (1975)
(Proposed Official Draft Complete Text and Commentary); see also d. at 410 (commentary
on § 150.4) ("[1If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unacceptable police
behavior, then the exclusion of fruits may also be necessary to achieve this deterrence.").
The statement of a suspect or an arrested person will be suppressed under §§ 150.2 and
150.3 if he was not provided Miranda-type warnngs: that "he is not obliged to say
anything, and anything he says may be used in evidence against him," "he will not be
questioned unless he wishes, he may consult a lawyer before being questioned and he may
have a lawyer present during any questioning," and that "if he wishes to consult a lawyer or
to have a lawyer present during questioning, but is unable to obtain one, he will not be
questioned until a lawyer has been provided for him; such advice shall also include
information on how he -may arrange to have a lawyer so provided." Id. at §§ 120.8(1)(d),
140.8(1), 150.2(3). The violation also must be "substantial" or otherwise prohibited by the
Constitution. Id. at § 150.3(1).
246 Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990).
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Even if the Elstad Court were justified in concluding that certain official
misconduct should not implicate the poisonous tree doctrine, a Miranda
violation should not fall m that category A Miranda violation represents a
failure to adhere to the Supreme Court's own rules designed to safeguard the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-mcrnmation. 247 Such
impropriety cannot be understated. The accused will be interrogated m an
inherently coercive setting without the assistance of counsel; without knowing
that he may remain silent in the face of accusations; without appreciating that
the interrogators must honor that right and stop all questioning; and without
understanding that all statements, if volunteered, can be used against him.248
The gravity of this misconduct begs for a broad application of the poisonous
tree doctrme.249
D. Two-Tier Analysis
From a practical perspective, the analytical framework for assessing
whether nontestimomal fruits of a Miranda violation should be suppressed is
anachronistic and unfairly skewed against defendants. The Supreme Court has
constructed a two-tier approach. First, a trial court must determine whether the
police improperly interrogated a suspect in custody without first reading the
Miranda warnings. 25 0 If so, the confession is presumed to be coerced and must
be excluded.25 1 Then, the trial court must engage in fact-finding to determine
whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, the confession was in fact
"voluntary" under the Fifth Amendment. 25 2 Only upon a finding of "actual"
coercion will the nontestimonial fruits be inadmissible.25 3
This two-tier approach introduces the shortcomings of the "old"
voluntariness standard that existed before Miranda into the derivative evidence
247 Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680-81 (1988).
248 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-70 (1966). "Very, very few individuals
know their constitutional rights concerning the making of a confession of guilt to a crime."
AUBRY & CAPUTO, supra note 25, at 34.
249 Iromcally, the Court's refusal to apply the poisonous tree doctrine to Miranda
violations will hurt those who most need to be advised of their nghts-first-time arrestees
and the mentally ill.
250 See United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Sangmeto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1515-16 (6th Cir. 1988).
251 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985).
252 See Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1048; Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d at 1517
253 See Gonzalez-SandovaI, 894 F.2d at 1048; Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d at 1517;
United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 601 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. dented,
488 U.S. 924 (1988).
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analysis.254 Instead of implementing the poisonous tree doctrine m a practical
and straightforward way, trial courts are required to expend additional time and
effort in "making difficult determinations of voluntarmess." 255 Although trial
courts are not unfamiliar with the voluntariness test,25 6 they can no longer
simply focus on whether the suspect was in custody and the Miranda warnings
were read. They must conduct additional, time-consuming, fact-finding
hearings to determine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and
make judgments about the suspect's ability to give a voluntary confession. 257
All of this comes at a time when trial courts are already overburdened with
criminal cases resulting from the so-called "war on drugs."
Moreover, the voluntariness standard provides defendants with very little
protection against the erroneous admission of tainted evidence. Because the
standard relies so heavily on a "swearing contest" about events that occurred m
secret, trial courts in the vast majority of cases can be expected to find the
police more credible than defendants and to resolve voluntariness questions in
favor of the government. 258
The standard's inherent bias against defendants will no doubt further
encourage the police to ignore the Miranda warnings in their search for
nontestimomal evidence. An interrogator seeking derivative evidence is not
likely to view the voluntariness standard as a barrier to admission of such
evidence. Indeed, the interrogator may even view the standard as an invitation
to bring considerable pressure to bear on the accused in the hope of discovering
some hidden fruit. Consequently, the re-emergence of the "old" due process
voluntariness standard may be accompanied by an increase in the number of
coerced confessions. 259
254 See Shapiro, supra note 200, at 340-41. For a discussion of the limitations of the
"old" voluntanness standard, see supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
255 Minmck v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 149 (1990).
256 The "voluntariness" standard is still relevant in several situations. See, e.g., Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423 (1986) (holding that waiver of Miranda rights must be
voluntary); Hams v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (holding that statement elicited
in violation of Miranda must be voluntary before it can be used to impeach defendant's trial
testimony).
257 See United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1355 (8th Cir. 1990) ("The
motivation and purpose of the Miranda opinion, as well as the ease of its application, are
undermined if its effect is to simply substitute the endless chain of voluntanness questions
that crowded court dockets prior to its announcement with a new class of case-by-case
determinations "); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1989).
258 Schulhofer, supra note 65, at 870-71.
259 See, e.g., United States v. Rullo, 748 F Supp. 36, 39 (D. Mass. 1990) (stating that
police officers punched and kicked apprehended suspect in an effort to locate gun); see
Schulhofer, supra note 65, at 871-72. Police coercion of witnesses and suspects-even
physical brutality-continues to exist as an ugly remnant of the past. See, e.g., United States
v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that confession was involuntary
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Unlike the two-tier approach, the poisonous tree doctrine has the virtue of
being easily understood and applied. Police officers who ignore the Miranda
warnings will know that both the confession and the nontestimomal fruits will
be suppressed. Trial courts faced with Miranda violations will know that
exclusion of the tainted derivative evidence is required. No additional fact-
finding will be necessary Most importantly, a clear message will be sent to the
police and prosecutors that the judiciary will not tolerate or reward police
misconduct of this kind.
E. Bnght-Lne Rules for Police
The Court in Elstad also refused to apply the poisonous tree doctrine to
Miranda violations in the belief that police officers sometimes err in deciding
when a person is in custody for purposes of reading the warnings. 260 The
Court believes such errors should not "breed the same irremediable
consequences" as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.26 1
There can be little dispute, however, that Miranda has provided clear
guidelines to the police.262 Even Justice O'Connor, the author of Elstad, has
when police officers threw defendant to the ground, repeatedly kicked him in the groin,
stomach and back, and threatened him with death); Cooper v. Scroggy, 845 F.2d 1385,
1391 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that confession was involuntary when detective struck
defendant m the face and threatened him with further physical abuse); United States
Attorney, District of Massachusetts, Press Release (July 10, 1991) (on file with author)
(summarizing results ofjomt investigation by United States Attorney and Federal Bureau of
Investigation into allegations that officers of the Boston Police Department violated federal
civil rights statutes while investigating the homicide of Carol Stuart) (finding coercion and
intimidation of civilian witnesses through the use of actual or implied threats of arrest,
imprisonment and physical beatings; efforts to trick witnesses into adopting incriminating
facts or information that were previously rejected; use of abusive, profane and threatening
language to witnesses who were interrogated; and use of coerced statements within
affidavits to obtain search warrants); REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE
Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (July 9, 1991) (investigation of excessive force by
officers of the Los Angeles Police Department in the wake of the videotaped beating of
Rodney King) (finding a significant number of officers who repetitively used excessive force
against the public and a majority of civil lawsuits involving "clear and often egregious
officer misconduct resulting in serious injury or death to the victim").
260 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).
261 Id.
262 The Court m Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988) (citations omitted),
recently observed: "A major purpose of the Court's opimon m Miranda v. Anzona, 384
U.S. at 441-42, was 'to give concrete guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to
follow.' As we have stressed on numerous occasions, '[o]ne of the principal advantages' of
Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application." Accord, Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 425 (1986); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979); see also Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("The meaning of Miranda has
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recognized this fact.263 The long history of Miranda shows that police officers
understand when the Miranda warnings are necessary Indeed, m the vast
majority of cases, the need for the warnings is clear. 264
The Elstad Court offered no evidence that most Miranda violations result
from inadvertent error. 265 To be sure, occasional cases exist m which the
police fail to read the Miranda warnings under the mistaken belief that they are
not required. However, the possibility that police officers might occasionally
err m deciding whether to read the warnings-which they could easily prevent
by giving them m ambiguous situations266-should not justify abandoning the
poisonous tree doctrine m all cases, including cases m which the police have
deliberately committed a Miranda violation.
Significant irony exists m the Court's position. On the premise that the task
of defining "custody" is a "slippery one,"267 the Court is willing to substitute
an amorphous voluntariness standard for the bright-line approach of the
poisonous tree doctrine. The question of whether custodial interrogation has
occurred is "much more focused than the voluntariness inquiry "268 The
become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its
strictures "); Schulhofer, supra note 65, at 879 ("Miranda certainly provided plenty of
guidance for the police. There was some potential ambiguity at the fringes of 'custody' and
'interrogation,' but the Court had taken a big step toward clarifying the ground rules of
permissible interrogation."); Minmck v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150 (1990) (stating that
"the Edwards rule provides 'clear and unequivocal' guidelines to the law enforcement
profession") (citation omitted).
263 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring m
part, dissenting in part) (noting Miranda's "now clear strictures").
264 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J., joins, dissenting). If
the Court were truly concerned about the custody issue, it would alter Miranda itself rather
than jettison the poisonous tree doctrine.
265 The Court has focused on the perception of the suspect, rather than on a police
officer's motives for failing to read the warnings. "This focus reflects the fact that Miranda
safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection
against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent
of the police." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
266 As the Eighth Circuit has noted recently:
We see no reason why doubts as to the presence or absence of custody should not be
resolved in favor of providing criminal suspects with the simple expedient of Miranda
warnigs. As noted in the Miranda opinion, and as demonstrated by case law and legal
authority appearing in the intervening years since the announcement of the Miranda
decision, the effectiveness of law enforcement is not undermined by informing suspects
of their rights.
United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1356 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
267 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).
268 Schulhofer, supra note 65, at 880.
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custody issue is, in short, an insufficient justification for abandomng the
poisonous tree doctrine.
F Elstad Distnguished
Despite the broad language in Elstad suggesting that the poisonous tree
doctrine is inapplicable to all fruits of a Miranda violation, the decision is
distinguishable from the opening example in one significant respect. After
making an initial unwarned statement, the defendant in Elstad was read the
Miranda warnings before confessing a second time.269 The warnings conveyed
to him the substance of his constitutional rights and enabled him to "exercise
his own volition" in deciding whether to make a second statement to the
police.270 Thus, the warnings arguably were sufficient "to remove the
[coercive] conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement" and
enabled the defendant to make a rational and informed choice whether to waive
or invoke his rights.271
In the opening example of this Article, by contrast, Jones was never given
the Miranda warnings before or during the interrogation. Unaware of his
constitutional rights, he could not make a rational and intelligent decision to
waive his rights and reveal the location of the gun. Because there was nothing
to remove the coercive conditions precluding admission of the suspect's
statement, the derivative evidence must be suppressed as a product of that
coercion. 272 Elstad, therefore, should not bar courts from suppressing
nontestimonial fruits of a Miranda violation.273
26 9 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301.
270 Id. at 308-09, 314-15.
271 Id. at 314. Elstad is distinguishable in a second respect from the opening example.
In E/stad, there was no evidence that the defendant's second confession was motivated by
his first statement. In the opening example, by contrast, the police learned of the location of
the weapon as a direct result of the suspect's unwarned statement.
272 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recently recognized this distinguishing
feature of E/stad. State v. Gravel, 601 A.2d 678, 684 (N.H. 1991).
273 Even assuming Elstad should be read broadly to permit the introduction of
nontestimonial fruits of a Miranda violation, state courts may suppress such evidence as a
matter of state law. Each state remains free to hold that its privilege against self-
incrimination or a state poisonous tree doctrine provides greater protection than their federal
counterparts. See, e.g., State v. Gravel, 601 A.2d 678, 682-86 (N.H. 1991) (holding that
defendant's statements in violation of Miranda cannot be relied upon to establish probable
cause for issuance of search warrant; tangible evidence found during execution of search
warrant suppressed under New Hampshire's guarantee against compelled self-
incrimination). See generally Miclugan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Each State has power to impose higher standards governing police practices
under state law than is required by the Federal Constitution."); Mary A. Crossley, Note,
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II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND NONTESTIMONIAL FRUIT
As explained earlier, Justice O'Connor argued m New York v. Quarles274
that nontestimomal fruits of a Miranda violation should be admissible.275
Relying on Fifth Amendment case law, she argued that Miranda, like the Fifth
Amendment, should only protect a suspect from being compelled to testify
against himself or otherwise give evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature; Miranda should not prohibit the police from using compelled statements
to discover nontestimonial fruits. 276
Justice O'Connor relies on an overly narrow reading of the Fifth
Amendment to limit the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule. The Fifth
Amendment protects a suspect from being compelled to testify against himself
or to provide evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.277 The Fifth
Amendment also prohibits the use of compelled communications against the
accused in any way 278 The Fifth Amendment "contains a self-executing rule
Miranda and the State Constitution: State Courts Take a Stand, 39 VAND. L. REV 1693
(1986).
Several state supreme courts have also taken a first step in that direction, refusing to
follow the reasomng of Elstad as a matter of state law. Commonwealth v. Smith, 593
N.E.2d 1288 (Mass. 1992); State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915 (rtenn. 1992); People v.
Bethea, 493 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1986). In Bethea, the Court of Appeals of New York ruled
that the state privilege against self-incrimination would have "little deterrent effect if the
police [knew] that as part of a continuous chain of events" they could first question a
suspect m custody without the Miranda warnings and then seek a subsequent confession
after the warnings had been given. Bethea, 493 N.E.2d at 938. Confronted with the opening
example, the Court of Appeals of New York would likely suppress the nontestimomal fruits
on a similar basis-to deter police misconduct and thus to ensure that suspects' Fifth
Amendment rights are respected. See also People v. Quarles, 444 N.E.2d 984, 985 (N.Y.
1982) (requiring suppression of nontestimomal fruit of a Miranda violation), revd on other
grounds, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); People v. Paulin, 255 N.E.2d 164,
167 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that police officer's failure to respect defendant's request for
counsel following reading of Miranda warnings required suppression of tangible fruit of
interrogation, a metal cooking pot allegedly used to murder husband). But see People v.
Holmes, 536 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (admitting knife sheath discovered
as a result of a confession obtained without Miranda warnings), appeal dened, 547 N.E.2d
957 (N.Y. 1989).
274 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
275 Id. at 667-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see supra notes
173-92 and accompanying text.
276 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 665-74.
277 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1961).
278 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (The Fifth Amendment
"prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any
respect."); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
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commanding the exclusion of evidence derived from [compelled]
commumcations." 279 Thus, the police are prohibited from using compelled
statements to gather evidence, including nontestimomal fruits, for use at
trial. 280 The Fifth Amendment is inapplicable only when nontestimomal
evidence is divorced from a testimonial or communumcative act.281
Far from supporting Justice O'Connor, Schmerber v. Californta282 actually
undermines her position. In Schmerber, the Court ruled that state officials
could extract a blood sample from a suspect in order to determine the chemical
279 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 350 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
280 See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 78 (1973); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453; Murphy v. Waterfront Conim'n, 378 U.S.
52, 79 (1964).
281 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 593-600 (1990); Doe v. United
States, 487 U.S. 201, 209-10 n.8 (1988); United States v. Dionislo, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
If a suspect-without a verbal response-shows police officers where physical evidence
is located or produces the evidence in response to custodial interrogation in violation of
Miranda, both the act of revealing the location of the evidence or the act of producing it and
the physical evidence itself should be suppressed under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme
Court has held that the act of producing physical evidence constitutes testimonial
communications protected under the Fifth Amendment when the act entails implicit
assertions of fact or discloses information. Doe, 487 U.S. at 209; United States v. Doe, 465
U.S. 605, 612 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). The suspect's act
of producing the nontestimomal evidence would convey to the police that the evidence
existed and that the suspect knew the evidence existed and where it was located. People v.
Hoffman, 419 N.E.2d 1145, 1149 (Ill. 1981) (holding that defendant's nonverbal act of
leading police to pistol in response to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings was
testimonial in nature and must be suppressed); In re Owen F., 523 A.2d 627, 630 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1987) (ruling that defendant's nonverbal act of gesturing to location of bag m
response to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings was inadmissible admission),
cert. dented, 528 A.2d 1286 (Md. 1987); State v. Wethered, 755 P.2d 797, 798-800
(Wash. 1988) (en bane) (stating that defendant's nonverbal act of producing hashish in
response to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings was testimonial in nature and
must be suppressed); State v. Moreno, 585 P.2d 481, 483 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that defendant's nonverbal act of producing three baggies of cocaine from his person in
response to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings was testimonial and must be
suppressed), rev. dented, 91 Wash. 2d 1014 (1979); see Doe, 487 U.S. at 209; Doe, 465
U.S. at 613 n.11; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10. For the reasons stated in Part I, the physical
evidence itself also must be suppressed as the fruit of this compelled testimonial
communication. See Hoffman, 419 N.E.2d at 1149 (ruling that pistol that suspect revealed
to police in response to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings was suppressed as
fruit of unwarned interrogation); State v. Preston, 411 A.2d 402, 408 (Me. 1980) (stating
that mattresses that suspect delivered to police in response to custodial interrogation without
Miranda warnings were suppressed as fruit of unwarned interrogation).
282 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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makeup of his blood and thereby draw an inference about his state of
mtoxication. 28 3 The state's compulsion failed to implicate the Fifth Amendment
not only because the evidence was nontestimomal, but also because "the
evidence was obtained in a manner that did not entail any testimonial act on the
part of the suspect." 284 As the Court in Schmerber noted, "Not even a shadow
of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused was
involved either in the extraction or in the chemical analysis. Petitioner's
testimonial capacities were in no way implicated." 285 The post-Schmerber cases
reflect this crucial distinction between a suspect being compelled himself to
serve as evidence, and a suspect being compelled to disclose or communicate
information that might serve as or lead to mcrimnating nontestimonial
evidence.286
283 Id. at 761.
284 Pennsylvania v. Mumz, 496 U.S. 582, 593 (1990).
285 Schnerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
286 See, e.g., Muniz, 496 U.S. at 593 ("This compulsion [in Schnerber] was outside of
the Fifth Amendment's protection, not simply because the evidence concerned the suspect's
physical body, but rather because the evidence was obtained in a manner that did not entail
any testimonial act on the part of the suspect "); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,
211 n.10 (1988) (The Schmerber line of cases "distinguished between the suspect's being
compelled himself to serve as evidence and the suspect's being compelled to disclose or
communicate information or facts that might serve as or lead to incriminating evidence.").
Justice O'Connor's attempt to limit the Court's prior Fifth Amendment cases
prohibiting the use of compelled confessions and their fruits to those situations where a
person is compelled to appear before "a court or other tribunal vested with the contempt
power" is unconvincing. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 669 (1985); see supra note
188. The Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule applies not only in such "formal"
proceedings, but also m custodial interrogations. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
444 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
Although Justice O'Connor is correct that custodial interrogation does not subject the
accused to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt, custodial
interrogation raises analogous choices and concerns. Muiz, 496 U.S. at 596-97 & n.10.
For instance, the pressure to respond flows from the inherently coercive environment of
custodial interrogation rather than the threat of contempt sanctions. Id. at 598-99; Miranda,
384 U.S. at 467 Moreover, false testimony may give rise to indirect sanctions-for
instance, "the prosecution might later prove at trial that the suspect lied to the police, giving
rise to an inference of guilty conscience." Mumz, 496 U.S. at 597 n.10. Thus, the suspect
faced with custodial interrogation confronts a "modern-day analog" of the cruel trilemma of
truth, falsity or silence just as surely as the person compelled to speak before a tribunal with
the contempt power. Id. at 596.
Justice O'Connor apparently now agrees with this assessment, given her agreement
with Part III-B of Justice Brennan's opinion in Muniz. Justice Brennan indicated there that,
despite the differences between official proceedings and custodial interrogations, "'all the
principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-
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In support of her position, Justice O'Connor relied on dicta m Schmerber
indicating that nontestimomal evidence is admissible even when the state's
compulsion also produces testimonial evidence. 287 But the compelled
statements m Schmerber, unlike the statement in the opening example, are not
exploited to reveal nontestimomal evidence. State officials can extract the
suspect's blood regardless of any statements he makes. The statements are
nothing more than a by-product of administering the blood test. They do not,
as in the opening example, enable the police to uncover incriminating evidence.
Even if the Fifth Amendment only protected a suspect's communications,
as Justice O'Connor argues, the poisonous tree doctrine would require
suppression of nontestimomal fruits. When the police coerce a suspect to reveal
the whereabouts of physical evidence, such evidence must be suppressed in
order to deter future constitutional violations.288 For the reasons discussed in
Part I above, When the police fail to read a suspect the Miranda warnings and
use the suspect's statements to discover nontestimonial evidence, the fruits must
be suppressed m order to deter future Miranda violations.289
Finally, Justice O'Connor has looked to the experience of foreign countries
to limit the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule.290 She is correct in that the
learning of countries like England, Scotland and India was "important to the
development of the initial Miranda rule." 291 Those countries had adopted
similar procedural rules to regulate the methods that the police used to secure
confessions from suspects. 292
Justice O'Connor errs, however, in suggesting that the Court in Miranda
looked to foreign rules in determining the maximum protections to be afforded
defendants in the United States.293 The Court did not feel compelled to mcme
those rules, noting that the foreign rules gave "at least as much protection to
[Fifth Amendment] rights as is given in the jurisdictions described." 294 Rather,
the Court looked to foreign law as a way of ascertaining whether its own new
restrictions would have an adverse impact on criminal law enforcement. 295
Finding "no marked detrimental effect" on law enforcement in any foreign
enforcement officers during in-custody questiomng.'" Id. at 596 n.10 (quoting Miranda,
384 U.S. at 461).
287 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 667-68 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 n.9); see supra
note 184.
288 Justice O'Connor appears to concede this point, given her recognition of a
"broader exclusionary rule" covering evidentiary fruits in cases of actual coercion. Quarles,
467 U.S. at 672; see supra note 226.
289 See supra notes 196-273 and accompanying text.
290 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 672-73; see supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
291 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673 (1985).
292 Id. (citing Confessions, supra note 39, at 1090-1114).
293 Id.
294 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 489 (1966) (emphasis added).
295 Id. at 486-89.
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jurisdiction, the Court concluded that lawlessness would not result m this
country from requiring police to warn suspects of their Fifth Amendment rights
and allowing them to exercise those rights.296
Justice O'Connor's reliance on foreign law as compelling authority for
limiting the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule must be rejected for a more
fundamental reason. 297 Foreign law cannot serve as an appropriate reference
for an American standard, for the legal traditions of other countries m the area
of criminal law differ markedly from the United States. In England and other
common-law countries, for instance, courts generally do not believe that
illegally obtained evidence should be excluded in order to deter police
misconduct.298 As one court noted pithily, "It is not the function of the court to
exclude evidence in order to discipline the police." 299 The tradition of England
and other common-law countries has been to exclude tainted evidence only
when it is considered unreliable and to leave the puishment of police
wrongdoing to separate proceedings. 300 Given this history, it is not surprising
that derivative evidence often is admitted regardless of police misconduct.301
296 Id. at 489.
297 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673 (1984).
298 See J.B. Dawson, The Exclusion of Unlawfidly Obtained Evidence: A Comparative
Study, 31 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 513, 536-37, 547 (1982); STEPHEN MITCHELL Er AL.,
ARCHBOL--PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES §§ 15-82, 15-93
(43rd ed. 1988); GERALD A. BEAUDOIN & ED RATUSHNY, THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 825, 835-36 (2d ed. 1989).
299 R. v. Dickson, 4 C.R.D. 850.60-01 (Ont. Co. Ct. 1984); see also R. v. Collins, 1
S.C.R. 265, 268 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1987).
300 See Dawson, supra note 298, at 547; BEAUDOIN & RATUSHNY, supra note 298, at
825.
301 See, e.g., Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, § 76(4)(a) (Eng.), repnnted in
17 HALISBURY STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES § 76 (1986) ("The fact that a
confession is wholly or partly excluded in pursuance of this section shall not affect the
admissibility in evidence of any facts discovered as a result of the confession."); The King
v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783). However, Canadian courts have recently
excluded derivative evidence under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See P.K.
MCWILLIAMS, CANADIAN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 3:10800 (3d ed. 1991). Moreover,
English and Scottish courts have discretion to exclude such evidence when police
misconduct threatens the fairness of the criminal proceedings. See Police and Criminal
Evidence Act § 78(1) ("In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which
the prosecution proposes* to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to
all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the
admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it."); MICHAEL ZANDER, THE POLICE AND
CRIMIAL EVIDENCE ACT OF 1984 116-17 (1985); B. MiRFIELD, CONFESSIONS 168
(1985); DAVID FIELD, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN SCOTLAND 315-16 (1988); Scottish Law
Commission, Memo No. 46 (Law of Evidence) I U21.02-.04 (Sept. 4, 1980); Department
Comm. on Criminal Procedure in Scotland (2d Report) (Cmnd. 6218) 1 7.27 (1975).
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This is in stark contrast with the experience m the United States. The
Supreme Court has long played a paramount role m ensuring that the police
comply with constitutional protections. 302 For nearly a century, the Court has
believed that the most effective way to prevent lawless police activities is to
enforce an exclusionary rule.303 Thus, the primary reason for excluding
evidence obtained by illegal means has been to discourage police abuses. 304
The probative value of the evidence has not been considered sufficient to
overcome the need for deterrence.30 5
For a more appropriate analogy, Justice O'Connor should look to the
experience of the United States military 306 The military provides an
appropriate comparison because the Fifth Amendment protections afforded
suspects in the military essentially are identical to those afforded to civilians.
Service personnel are protected from being compelled to mcrimnate
themselves under the Fifth Amendment and Article 31(a) of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice.307 If an officer intends to interrogate 308 a suspect309 about
an offense, the officer must first give the Miranda warnings3 10 and advise the
suspect of the statutory rights set forth m Article 31(b). 311 The Miranda and
302 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897).
303 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
304 See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (stating that "prime purpose"
of exclusionary rule is to deter "future unlawful police conduct"); Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
305 See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
306 The Court in Miranda reviewed the rules prevailing in the military to assess the
danger to law enforcement from curbs on interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 468,
489 (1966).
307 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 31(a), 10 U.S.C. § 831(a) (1983)
[hereinafter U.C.M.J.] ("No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to
mcrminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to inime inate
him.").
308 "Interrogation includes any formal or informal questioning in which an
mnminating response either is sought or is a reasonable consequence of such questioning."
MIL. R. EVID. 305(b)(2), repnnted in STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG Er AL., MArrARY RULEs
OF EVIDENCEMANUAL (3d ed. 1991).
309 A suspect is a service member whom the military questioner believes or reasonably
should believe committed an offense under the Code. United States v. Hilton, 32 M.J. 393,
396 (C.M.A. 1991); United States v. Good, 32 M.J. 105, 108 (C.M.A. 1991).
310 United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629 (C.M.A. 1967).
311 Article 31(b) of the U.C.M.J. requires a military interrogator, prior to any
questioning, to inform the suspect "of the nature of the accusation and advis[e] hu that he
does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of wluch he is accused or
suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a
trial by court-martial."
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Article 31(b) warnings are normally merged so that the suspect is advised that
he has the right to remain silent, and that any statement he makes can be used
as evidence against him.312 The suspect is also advised of the right to have
counsel appointed, to consult with counsel, and to have counsel present during
questiomng.313 Once proper warnings are given, the suspect's statements will
be adnussible only if he has validly waived his rights and voluntarily chosen to
speak. 314 If the suspect indicates a desire to stop talking or to see counsel at
any time during questioning, the interrogation must cease until counsel has
been provided or the suspect hinself initiates further conversation. 315
When an officer fails to give the appropriate warnings, the suspect's
subsequent statements are deemed involuntary and will be suppressed. 316 More
312 See MIL. R. Evm. 305(c); DAvID A. SCHLUETER, MILrrARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5-2(B), at 157 (2d ed. 1987). The warnings are not required
when public safety is of concern. United States v. Jones, 26 M.J. 353, 357 (C.M.A. 1988).
313 See MIL. R. EVID. 305(d). If the interrogator knows or reasonably should know
that counsel either has been appointed for or retained by the accused or suspect, counsel
must be notified of the intended interrogation and be given a reasonale time to attend
before questiomng begins. Id. at 305(e). Failure to provide such notice to counsel may
result m an inadmissible statement. Id. at 305(a).
314 MIL. R. EVID. 305(g). The confession must also satisfy the due process
requirement of voluntariness. Id. at 304(a), 304(c)(3); United States v. Butner, 15 M.J. 139,
143 (C.M.A. 1983) (threats rendered statement involuntary). "An admission or
confession may be considered evidence against the accused on the question of guilt or
innocence only if independent evidence, either direct or circumstantial, has been introduced
that corroborates the essential facts admitted to justify sufficiently an inference of their
truth." MIL. R. EVID. 304(g). "Other uncorroborated confessions or admissions of the
accused that would themselves require corroboration may not be used to supply this
independent evidence." Id. "The independent evidence [necessary to establish
corroboration] need raise only an inference of the truth of the essential facts admitted." Id.
at 305(g)(1). "It need not be sufficient of itself to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the
truth of facts stated in the admission or confession." Id.
315 MI.. R. EvID. 305(o.
316 U.C.M.J., Art. 31(d) ("No statement obtained in violation of [Article 31], or
through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may be received in
evidence against a suspect in a trial by court-martial."); MIL. R. EVID. 304(a) ("[A]n
involuntary statement may not be received in evidence against any accused who made
the statement if the accused makes a timely motion to suppress or an objection to the
evidence under this rule."); id. at 304(c)(3) ("A statement is 'involuntary' if it is obtained in
violation of the self-incrimination privilege or due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, Article 31, or through the use of coercion, unlawful
influence, or unlawful inducement."); United States v. Phillips, 32 M.J. 76, 78-79 (C.M.A.
1991) (failing to give Article 31 warnings results in involuntary statements which must be
suppressed); United States v. McCoy, 31 M.J. 323, 328 (C.M.A. 1990).
The Military Rules of Evidence recogmze several exceptions to the foregoing
requirements. MIL. R. EVID. 304(b)(1) (statements that are involuntary only in terms of
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importantly, military courts will also suppress "any derivative evidence," 317
unless the prosecution can show that the evidence "was not obtained by use of
the statement[s]," 318 or that the evidence "would have been obtained even if
the statement[s] had not been made." 319 Thus, military courts faced with the
opening example would exclude both the suspect's unwarned statements and
the nontestimonial fruits, absent a sufficient showing that one of the exceptions
is applicable.
The Supreme Court should emulate the military by ruling that
nontestimonial evidence derived from statements in violation of Miranda
should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. It would be anomalous
indeed if civilians had fewer protections than those serving m the military
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court would deliver a "crippling blow" 320 to Miranda if the
prosecution were permitted to use nontestimonial fruits of a Miranda violation
at trial. Without the sanction of the poisonous tree doctrine, the police would
have much to gain and little to lose by interrogating suspects without reading
the Miranda warnings. Miranda would be rendered a mere "form of
words." 321
The Supreme Court's current thinking about Miranda appears to reflect a
dislike of that landmark ruling and a preference for the days when the police
interrogated suspects without advising them of their rights. What can explain
such a departure from long-standing precedent? Perhaps, the Court is heeding
the calls of those who seek to expedite convictions of suspected criminals. 322
compliance with right to counsel warmngs may be used to impeach defendant's in-court
testimony or in a later prosecution for perjury, false swearing or the making of a false
official statement); id. at 304(b)(2) ("[E]vidence that was obtained as a result of an
involuntary statement may be used when the evidence would have been obtained even if the
involuntary statement had not been made.").
317 MIL. R. EVID. 304(a); United States v. Churnovic, 22 M.J. 401, 407 (C.M.A.
1986) (failing to give a suspect the warings required by Article 31(b) of the U.C.M.J.
renders inadmissible any statement that may result and any evidence derived therefrom).
See United States v. Haynes, 27 C.M.R. 60, 62 (C.M.A. 1958).
318 MIL. R. EVID. 304Qb)(3).
319 Id
.
320 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 319 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
321 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, J.).
322 However, the great weight of empirical evidence (although dated) indicates that
Miranda has not had a significant impact on the police's ability to obtain confessions.
White, supra note 1, at 19 n.99 (collecting studies); see, e.g., Richard Medalie, et al.,
Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capitol: 77Te Attempt to Implement Miranda,
66 MICH. L. REV 1347 (1968); Special Project, Interrogation in New Haven, 77 Impact
of Miranda, 76 YALE L. J. 1519 (1967); see also CRIMiNAL JUsTICE IN CRISIS 33 (A.B.A.
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The Court's departure also may be a response to the significant rate of crime in
this country 323
Whatever the motive, the Supreme Court must not forget that the Miranda
warnings play a very important role in our criminal justice system. The
warings are not simply a protection for the guilty; they are an essential
safeguard for the innocent. The innocent include suspects who, like Jones in
the opening example, can identify the existence or location of physical evidence
in response to police questioning.
If Miranda is to have any continuing efficacy, the Supreme Court must
send a very different message to federal and state courts. Nontestimomal
evidence derived from statements in violation of Miranda must be suppressed
as fruit of the poisonous tree. This will ensure that the police have every
incentive to obey the law while enforcing the law For "in the end life and
liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves." 324
Special Comm. on Criminal Justice in a Free Society) (1988) ("Both the public and the legal
profession must be made aware that Miranda, however controversial it has been, has little
effect on society's ability to deal with crime today. Its deimse would do little to decrease
crime or to improve the effectiveness of prosecutions. There should also be wider
recognition of Miranda's virtues. Although it does little to impede the police in their
investigations, Miranda has a very important symbolic value, reminding police officers of
the limits of their authority over suspects. It has also helped to professionalize police
departments and very likely to reduce the incidence of physically coerced confessions.").
Moreover, studies indicate that the "costs" of the exclusionary rule are not substantial.
See, e.g., Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress
and "Lost Cases" 7he Effects of the Exclusionaty Rule in Seven Junsdictions, 81 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1064 (1991); Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at IWat We
Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusonary Rule: h77e NI Study
and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. Rps. J. 611, 621 (1983); Peter
F Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusonary Rule: An Empircal Assessment, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585 (1983).
323 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1991 (111th
ed.) Washington, D.C. 1991 (crime rates for 1985-89).
324 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
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